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1Chapter 1
Anatomy of Occupational Licensing
Dentists, doctors, lawyers, hair braiders, tour guides, upholster-
ers, and horse tooth fi lers are now licensed occupations in either all 
or some U.S. states. In states where occupations are licensed, the 
rationale for meeting the requirements is sometimes inconsistent. 
For example, in Minnesota, it usually takes more direct classroom 
time hours to become a cosmetologist than a lawyer. In other states, it 
takes twice as many hours of training to become a manicurist than a 
paramedic (Dranias 2007). In Louisiana, the only state in the country 
that requires licenses for fl orists, monks were until recently forbid-
den to sell coffi ns because they were not licensed funeral directors 
(Carpenter et al. 2012). Nationally, in the 1990s, one could become a 
physical therapist with just a bachelor’s degree, but by 2016, in order 
to become a fully licensed physical therapist in most states, a practi-
tioner must have a doctor of physical therapy degree, which requires 
a four-year college degree plus three years of graduate training and 
work. 
These regulations are not just unusual cases of state laws run 
amok. Instead they refl ect policies deriving from one of the fastest 
growing labor market institutions in the United States—the gov-
ernment licensing of jobs and work tasks. This form of regulation, 
largely established by state governments and implemented through 
their licensing boards, is often referred to as “the right to practice.” 
Under these laws, working for pay in a licensed occupation is illegal 
without fi rst meeting government standards. Certifi cation, another 
form of government regulation, provides a “right to title” and does 
not forbid others from providing the service. 
In the 1970s, about 10 percent of individuals who worked for pay 
required licenses, but by 2008, that number rose to almost 30 percent 
(Kleiner and Krueger 2013). By the turn of the century, more than 800 
occupations, including shampoo specialists and professional wres-
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tlers, in addition to the occupations mentioned above, were licensed 
in at least one state (Carpenter et al. 2012). More workers are directly 
impacted by occupational licensing than the minimum wage or union-
ization (Kleiner and Krueger 2010).
Occupational licensing has had a curious and unusual history in 
the United States and in other countries. During some periods it all but 
disappeared, but now in the United States it is a rapidly growing labor 
market institution. For some occupations, such as physicians, it has 
dominated the labor market and its effects on consumers. For others, 
such as interior designers, occupational licensing has been limited to 
a small number of U.S. states. This book addresses several questions 
regarding how and why some occupations became heavily regulated 
while others did not. Why do some countries have lots of occupa-
tions that are licensed and others a relatively small number? Why 
has occupational licensing grown over the past 50 years and unions 
have declined? What are its economic effects on mobility, wage deter-
mination, prices, and the quality of services delivered? Occupational 
licensing, in spite of its growth, size, and economic impact, has been 
a stealth form of regulation. In this book, I examine why the institu-
tion of occupational licensing has had such a curious evolution and 
infl uence in the United States, the European Union, and China, and I 
discuss the many similarities it has to guilds. 
With growth of licensing laws has come a national patchwork 
of stealth regulation that has, among other things, restricted labor 
markets, innovation, and worker mobility. There is little reason, for 
example—political, economic, or safety related—for math teachers to 
be relicensed every time they move from one state to another. These 
requirements put additional burdens on teachers who are moving 
across state lines, such as more course work, state residency require-
ments, and often additional exams, all of which reduce the ability of 
good teachers to fi nd work faster and students to have high-quality 
instructors. 
Having more fl exible reciprocity between states for occupations 
such as teachers, physicians, or dentists would allow these profes-
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sionals to move to jobs more effi ciently. But perhaps even better 
would be for states to certify jobs that are currently licensed—such 
as tour guides, hair braiders, travel agents, or locksmiths—jobs that 
pose minimal risk of harm to the public and that could better serve 
customers with a lesser form of regulation. 
 The political economy of occupational licensing has evolved so 
that both liberals and conservatives have come to oppose certain ele-
ments of it. Many on the left are concerned about individuals raising 
prices for the essential services of licensed plumbers or electricians 
and the availability of essential services for those in or near poverty. 
Many licensed professions are relatively low-skilled jobs, such as 
barbers, manicurists, nurse’s aides, and cosmetologists. The social 
costs of a bad haircut may be negligible, but the social costs of cre-
ating additional employment barriers for disadvantaged populations 
are not. Many education requirements, continuing education courses, 
and residency requirements restrict entry into occupations that are 
the most accessible for low-income individuals. Licensure laws often 
exclude ex-felons—defensible in many professions but not in all—
and such prohibitions make it extremely diffi cult for ex-offenders to 
fi nd postprison employment, thereby contributing to America’s high 
recidivism rate (Raphael 2014). On the right, public interest groups 
such as the Institute for Justice have opposed occupational licensing 
based on economic liberty arguments, arguing that it reduces eco-
nomic effi ciency and retards economic growth (Carpenter et al. 2012). 
There is good reason for workers in licensed fi elds to push for 
licensing laws. More occupations in a service-oriented economy are 
likely to be licensed than in manufacturing. With the shift to more 
service jobs from 40 percent in 1950 to more than 60 percent in 2007, 
occupational licensing has grown (Edlin and Haw 2014). As I found 
when I examined these issues with Princeton economist Alan Krueger, 
former treasury offi cial and head of President Obama’s Council of 
Economic Advisers, occupational licensing raises wages by 10 to 18 
percent (even controlling for factors such as age, education, and other 
market variables) and raises benefi ts for licensed workers (Gittleman, 
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Klee, and Kleiner 2015; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). This is largely 
due to the ability of regulated professions working through state leg-
islators and regulatory boards to limit the supply of practitioners and 
eventually drive up costs to consumers.1 
For more necessary services, such as dentistry, less competition 
brought about by licensure may drive prices beyond the means of 
individuals with low incomes. Consumers who cannot afford licensed 
professionals may do the work themselves. For example, David 
Kruithoff, a farmhand in Michigan, gave himself a root canal because 
he said he could not afford a licensed dentist (Kleiner 2006). 
INCENTIVES FOR REGULATION
From the time of medieval guilds, service providers have had 
strong incentives to create barriers to entry for their professions in 
order to raise wages (Ogilvie 2014). These guilds offered an effective 
mechanism where guild members and politicians could collaborate 
in capturing a larger slice of the economic rents and redistributing it 
to themselves at the expense of the rest of the economy. As Ogilvie 
(2014) notes, guilds are not just historical curiosities, they have wider 
implications for the role of institutions in economic growth.
Dartmouth economist Charles Wheelan’s research on licensed 
and unlicensed professions in Illinois fi nds that the stronger a profes-
sion’s political organization, the more likely it is to become licensed 
(Wheelan 1998). He showed that respiratory therapists who orga-
nized themselves, and raised their profession’s dues in order to lobby 
for licensing laws, tended to be more successful in getting these stat-
utes passed. 
In contrast, consumers who will be affected by the slightly higher 
costs of, for example, haircuts, are unorganized and arguably under-
represented in the political process. The willingness of a legislature 
to pass licensure laws without a rigorous analysis of its benefi ts rela-
tive to costs, or the alternatives of less rigorous forms of regulation, 
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creates the opportunity for well-organized producer groups to lobby 
for laws that will likely bring them personal gain. The arguments for 
occupational licensing policies are that purveyors of a service have 
greater information about the quality of the service and can take 
advantage of consumers over both price and quality.
Also, all consumers do not demand the same level of quality. 
When members of the legal profession told the Nobel laureate Milton 
Friedman that every lawyer should be of Cadillac quality (a high-
priced luxury brand car), he famously replied that many people would 
be better off with a Chevy (a cheaper but clearly functional alterna-
tive). If licensure “improves quality” simply by restricting entry into 
the profession, then some consumers will be forced to pay for more 
“quality” than they want or need (Friedman 1962). 
There have been, however, movements toward stopping or reduc-
ing the growth of occupational regulation in the United States. For 
example, during the 2012–2013 legislative sessions, Iowa Governor 
Terry Branstad vetoed the licensing of addictive disorder counselors 
and other related occupations (Branstad 2013). In Indiana, Gover-
nor Mike Pence initially vetoed the licensing of diabetes counsel-
ors, anesthesiologist assistants, and dietitians but a year later signed 
similar legislation. In their messages to the legislature (in each case, 
legislatures were dominated by their own parties), both Branstad and 
Pence mentioned that this type of regulation would result in economic 
losses to consumers, higher prices, and less employment (Associated 
Press 2013). More recently, in Idaho, Governor Butch Otter vetoed 
the licensing of sign-language interpreters during the 2015 legislative 
session (Reynolds 2015). In the eyes of these three governors, the 
promised benefi t of potentially better quality and health and safety 
was, in their view, far smaller than the costs infl icted on the citizens 
by unneeded regulation. 
Unlike the United States, China (along with most other coun-
tries), has national licensing for its regulated occupations. An unusual 
case study is Poland, which is in the process of deregulating many 
of its national occupational labor markets (Kleiner and Lachowska 
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2014). In October 2011, Poland’s national government presented an 
ambitious agenda of deregulating entry to many occupations. By late 
2015, the government plans to liberalize the access to about 250 out of 
the 380 currently regulated occupations. The prime minister’s offi ce 
has stated that liberalizing access to occupations is expected to lead to 
higher employment, higher-quality services, lower prices, and lower 
governmental administrative costs. The fi rst phase loosened access to 
51 professions; it was passed by the Polish Parliament in April 2013 
and signed into law in July 2013. The liberalization of access to 33 
of these fi rst 51 liberalized occupations went into effect in August 
2013. For the remainder, the new legislation went into effect in Janu-
ary 2014. The range of partially or totally deregulated professions 
is diverse as well as varying in the degree of deregulation. Among 
professions strongly affected by the liberalization are attorneys, solic-
itors, notaries, court clerks, realtors, taxi drivers, excursion guides, 
employment agents, and body guards. The implementation and evalu-
ation of these occupations should be an interesting and informative 
case study of the infl uence of the deregulation of occupations. 
Some state governors, the Federal Trade Commission, and the 
Institute for Justice, a public interest nonprofi t legal organization that 
handles legal cases for individuals involved in occupational licensing 
disputes among other libertarian issues, are naturally wary of pro-
ducer groups. Organizations such as the American Society of Interior 
Designers are seeking licensure for interior designers in all states. 
They are attempting to present evidence on how potentially harmful 
certain professions are to the public, while simultaneously arguing 
that all existing practitioners of these potentially dangerous profes-
sions be exempted from the proposed licensure requirements. 
Given its importance to the economy and labor market, occupa-
tional licensing is an institution that has largely been ignored as a fac-
tor that may infl uence employment, wages, prices, innovation, access, 
and quality. The purpose of this book is to give the public, consumers, 
and students of the labor market a detailed nontechnical look at and 
an examination of the curious institution of occupational licensing 
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in the United States, China, and the European Union. Occupational 
licensing is rarely discussed and does not receive the media attention 
that its size and scope warrant. The book will provide an examination 
of the institution of occupational licensing from a historical perspec-
tive, a rationale for the existence of occupational licensing, an inter-
national perspective, a view from the perspective of consumers, and 
fi nally, some unintended consequences of policies that have occurred 
to deal with issues that have arisen because of occupational licens-
ing. Readers of this book, be they members of a regulated occupa-
tion, consumers, or voters who infl uence policy, will become more 
informed about the curious guildlike institution of occupational regu-
lation in the United States and elsewhere. 
Note
 1. An alternative explanation of this wage growth could be that training 
and education enhance the value of services provided by regulated prac-
titioners, and as a consequence these individuals may earn more than 
their unlicensed counterparts.
Kleiner 2015.indb   7 11/23/2015   1:34:17 PM
Kleiner 2015.indb   8 11/23/2015   1:34:18 PM
9Chapter 2
The Evolution of 
Occupational Licensing
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
–George Santayana (1905, p. 284)
If we look at recent characteristics of occupational licensing, we 
see various stages of its evolution and history. In the fi ctional short 
story and subsequent fi lm “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” 
(Fitzgerald 2008), the main character is living his life in reverse—he 
begins his life as an old man and then grows younger. He fi nds the 
right age for his true love (who is living life in the traditional manner, 
going from young to old) not at the beginning or end of his life, but 
in the middle. In the case of licensing, it is a labor market institu-
tion that has been growing over time while unions have been in a 
state of decline (Ham and Kleiner 2007; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). 
Unions and licensing were intersecting during the 1970s through the 
1990s, and when these two institutions interact, their infl uence in the 
labor market raises wages for those fortunate enough to be in both a 
unionized and licensed job (Kleiner and Krueger 2010; Gittleman and 
Kleiner, forthcoming). 
Understanding the development of occupational regulation is an 
important element in understanding its effects in the labor and prod-
uct markets, as well as how public policies have evolved and how 
they may be changed. This is especially the case for states, such as 
Colorado, that have been able to establish rigorous methods to evalu-
ate the effi cacy of occupations seeking to become licensed. In this 
chapter I present a historical background for the evolution of occu-
pational regulation and then give specifi c examples of occupations 
(physicians, mortgage brokers, and interior designers) that have 
moved from no or little regulation to full-blown levels of occupa-
tional licensing for all in the occupation. 
Kleiner 2015.indb   9 11/23/2015   1:34:18 PM
10   Kleiner
Milton and Rose Friedman, in their book Free to Choose and 
later 10-part television documentary series that was fi rst broadcast in 
1980, shared their views of political economy. One chapter (or seg-
ment, in the documentary series) dealt with occupational licensing 
and the relationship with unions. The segment in the commentary by 
Friedman begins as follows:
Hippocrates and his followers started medicine on the road 
forward to becoming a science. When Hippocrates died at the 
age of 104, or so legend has it, this “Greek” island was full 
of medical people, his students and disciples. Competition for 
customers was fi erce. Some 20 years after he died they got 
together and constructed a code of conduct. They named it the 
Hippocratic Oath, after their old teacher and master. Every new 
physician, before he could start practice, came to this spot here 
in front of those columns and took the Oath. The oath was full 
of fi ne ideals for protecting the patient. But it also had a couple 
of other things in it.
Listen to this one, “I will impart a knowledge of the art to 
my own self and those of my teachers and to disciples bound 
by a stipulation and oath according to the law of medicine, but 
to none others.” Today we’d call that a closed shop. Or listen to 
this one referring to patients suffering from the agonizing dis-
ease of kidney or bladder stones: “I will not cut persons laboring 
under the stone but will leave this to be done by men who are 
practitioners of this work.” A nice market-sharing agreement 
between physicians and surgeons. Hippocrates must turn in his 
grave when a new class of medical men takes that oath. After 
all, he taught anyone, provided only they pay his tuition. He 
would strongly have objected to the kind of restrictive practices 
that physicians all over the world have adopted to protect their 
custom.
In the United States the American Medical Association has 
for decades been one of the strongest labor unions in the coun-
try, keeping down the number of physicians, keeping up the 
costs of medical care, preventing competition by people from 
outside the profession with those in it; all, of course, in the name 
of helping the patient.
Without warning, anyone of us may suddenly need medical 
care. If we do, we want the very best care we can get. But who 
can give us that care?
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Is it always a graduate of an expensive medical school 
who has a union card called a medical license? Or might it be 
someone like this, a trained paramedic working for a private-
enterprise organization rendering emergency care?
The sweeping statement I make is that the prosperity of this 
country derives primarily from freedom of enterprise and free-
dom to hire, to employ, to work, and not from restrictive mea-
sures imposed by trade unions. (Friedman and Friedman 1980)1 
The link between licensing and unions is obvious. Traditional 
economic theory has generally treated the actions of trade unions in 
the labor market as a variant of monopoly behavior in product mar-
kets (Cartter 1959). For example, at the time of contract negotiations, 
the trade union acts as a single voice representing its members, and 
consequently, the employer is faced with a single seller of labor. 
Furthermore, both institutions have legal protections. This has simi-
larities with licensing, but with licensing there are few sellers at a 
given wage. This is likely to occur because fewer workers are will-
ing to work because of the government-granted monopoly that lim-
its new entrants and makes being in the occupation more expensive 
in part because of continuing education and annual state-mandated 
fees. Subsequent analysis by Freeman and Medoff (1984) argues that 
unions have both a monopoly and voice effect. The monopoly effect 
is similar to that presented by Cartter, who suggests that supply is 
reduced but the voice effect provides benefi ts beyond just the fi nan-
cial ones. These benefi ts include grievance procedures and the ability 
to have seniority determine promotions and wages rather than having 
them assigned only by the employer.
Unions also can engage in concerted activities, such as strikes or 
work to rule, that can raise the cost to the fi rm of employing organized 
workers relative to nonunion ones. If the companies or plants want 
to avoid these concerted activities, they have to pay the higher wage 
and benefi t package. Therefore, unions have the ability to reallocate 
a fi rm’s resources away from shareholders, profi ts, or capital invest-
ment and toward workers. Recent estimates of these reallocations are 
the present value equivalent of $40,500 per worker in 1998 dollars 
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over the duration of the worker’s employment with the fi rm (Lee 
and Mas 2012). To the extent that economic rents are present in the 
fi rm because of patents, location advantages, or economies of scale, 
unions are able to reallocate part of those resources to union mem-
bers. In addition, unions in the private sector are given legitimacy and 
certain levels of economic protection through federal legislation, such 
as the National Labor Relations Act (Kleiner and Weil 2012).2 In the 
public sector, laws governing unions are established at the state level. 
Consequently, through their ability to monopolize labor at the fi rm 
level and public policy protections through federal and state statutes, 
unions also should be able to drive up wages and benefi ts.
Recent histories of the evolution of guilds in the Middle Ages 
suggest that they evolved in large part to protect from competition the 
makers of small crafts and businesses, such as blacksmiths and furni-
ture makers (Friedman 1962; Humphris 2013). The guilds argued that 
they were mainly protecting the public from incompetent or unscru-
pulous purveyors of products or services. In order for quality to be 
high, only the skilled craftsman of the particular guild could provide 
the service. As long as there were small enterprises and persuasive 
enforcement mechanism by the guild, along with the political power 
of the local political establishment, these enterprises were able to 
maintain the largely monopoly power of the guild system throughout 
Europe. 
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution in both the United 
Kingdom and the United States, smaller enterprises that competed 
at the local level gave way to larger enterprises, such as car manu-
factures or steel mills, whose markets were national or international. 
Consequently, the ability to control markets was much more diffi cult. 
Workers in these industrial enterprises did many of the same tasks 
established by the enterprise and no longer needed guilds. It became 
much harder to restrict entry or impose governmental entry require-
ments on these large enterprises, and therefore, in a largely industrial 
economy, occupational guilds declined (Ogilvie 2014). 
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During the 1830s and through the later part of the nineteenth 
century, there were few occupations in the United States that were 
licensed. In response to Jacksonian populism, the dominant view 
about government within the political economy and politics at the 
time was that few occupations should be licensed by the states. Nev-
ertheless, in the late 1800s, several states established educational cri-
teria for the licensing of physicians. In 1882, a physician by the name 
of Frank Dent wanted to practice medicine in West Virginia, but he 
had credentials from another state, and the medical school that he had 
attended was not recognized in West Virginia. Dent was convicted, 
and his medical license was revoked.
The case reached the Supreme Court, and the Court unanimously 
upheld the law in West Virginia, establishing the right of states, rather 
than the federal government, to grant licenses; thus, in 1889, Dent v. 
West Virginia 129 U.S. 114 (1899) was issued. The decision estab-
lished that state law purporting to protect the health, welfare, or safety 
of citizens was justifi ed as having a rational relationship to the legiti-
mate end of government under the police powers of the states (Gross 
1984). This took away the federal right of preemption in the arena of 
occupational licensing and gave it to the states. This is different from 
most other later labor laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act, 
which established federal law over any state provisions dealing with 
the regulation of unions and management on collective bargaining. 
The implication was that each state could establish the level of entry 
barriers, maintenance for remaining licensed, and the penalties for 
practicing without having a license. 
In response to the changes that occurred during the Progressive 
Era, as epitomized by President Theodore Roosevelt, more states 
began to regulate and license more occupations. The Sherman Anti-
trust Act was passed in 1890, and there was a signifi cant change in the 
number of occupations that became licensed. In his article “Freedom 
of Contract,” law professor Lawrence Friedman (1965) relates the 
major legal principles on licensing and other labor reforms that were 
taking place during this period.
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In the same period, 1890 to 1910, occupational licensing fi rst 
achieved a fi rm foothold in the statute-books of most American 
states. Laws to license doctors, plumbers, barbers, funeral direc-
tors, nurses, electricians, horseshoers, dentists, and the practi-
tioners of many other occupations were debated, propounded 
and very often passed. Many of these laws gave rise to consti-
tutional test cases. Unlike the more spectacular labor law cases, 
the licensing cases called down no pronouncements of doom 
and enlisted neither proponents nor opponents in high and aca-
demic places to argue validity and propriety on the basis of fi rst 
principles. This was a quieter, blander area of constitutional 
law. From the standpoint of logic and of life, however, the cases 
involved fi rst principles no less than those which arose under 
wage and hour laws. If a workman had a constitutional and 
God-given right to work eleven hours a day in a bakeshop, or 
to be paid in kind instead of cash, he should have had a similar 
right to contract with an unlicensed barber or to buy a laxative 
from a druggist without a certifi cate on his wall. (p. 489) 
During this period, physicians and dentists in the United States 
achieved nearly universal licensing. However, occupational licensing 
was mainly confi ned to a few occupations in health and law. Fol-
lowing World War II and the move to a service-oriented economy, 
there was a resurgence of occupational licensing in which the gov-
ernment—largely at the state level—determined the entry require-
ments and the criteria to remain a member in good standing within 
an occupation. The service sector then was much like the medieval 
guilds—they operated in local markets and could control entry by 
working with local politicians and representatives of the occupations 
to promote occupational licensing laws. A standard method of getting 
an occupation license involved forming an association and establish-
ing a dues collection mechanism, part of which could be used to lobby 
both legislative and executive branches of state government. Because 
fees from licensed members of the occupation are greater than the 
cost of monitoring the licensing provisions of the occupation, the 
government entity doing the licensing is more likely to gain revenue 
as a consequence of this form of regulation. The process provides an 
incentive for members of the occupation, government offi cials, and 
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the executive branch of government to pass and sign licensing legis-
lation. Even when a governor such as Mike Pence of Indiana is con-
vinced of the negative consequences of the law, political factors often 
tend to dominate the process. In his case, he initially vetoed and then 
signed legislation that licensed several health-related occupations. 
CASE STUDIES OF OCCUPATIONS SEEKING LICENSURE
Since all occupations reach varying levels of regulation in dif-
ferent ways, I will present background for three occupations—physi-
cians, mortgage brokers, and interior designers—and show how they 
evolved into full licensure. Specifi cally, I provide information on the 
evolution of licensure of these occupations across a continuum of reg-
ulation, and I show how regulation infl uences a variety of occupations 
at various stages of regulation. 
Physicians 
By defi nition, a person licensed to practice medicine is a medi-
cal doctor and is an individual who heals or infl uences healing. The 
fi rst physician licensing laws were passed in the 1870s by the states in 
order to stem what was viewed by physicians as uncontrolled access 
to the market. By 1881, half of the states had physician licensure, 
although serious enforcement did not begin until the 1890s (Baker 
1984). Under the new regulations, unlicensed medical practice was to 
be punished by fi ne or imprisonment. The publication of the Flexner 
Report in 1910, sponsored by the American Medical Association 
(AMA), eventually led to AMA control of medical education and 
regulation of physicians and auxiliary workers (Flexner 1910).3 The 
report argued for higher levels of education and greater control of the 
medical profession by doctors. It also recommended that the number 
of openings in medical school be limited. One of the main conse-
quences of the rise of physician licensing is that medical doctors are 
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now required to pass additional exams after graduation from medical 
school and do residencies to become licensed physicians. A key issue 
is that licensure endows physicians with considerable control over 
what services and work tasks nonphysicians are allowed to perform 
under state law or administrative rules established by state admini- 
strative boards. The Flexner Report resulted in the AMA’s gaining 
de facto control of licensing and regulation of physicians across all 
states through the Federation of State Medical Boards (Beck 2004). 
The number of physicians relative to the population declined by 15 
percent over the next 30-year period following the report, leading to 
substantial gains in physicians’ earnings. 
In an analysis of the impact of these restrictions on wage deter-
mination for doctors, Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets, who 
each won the Nobel Prize in economics, noted the large impact of 
the AMA on enhancing the earnings of doctors following the Flexner 
Report (Friedman and Kuznets 1945). For example, the authors make 
the argument that the difference in ease of entry refl ects a deliberate 
policy to limit the total number of physicians to prevent so-called 
overcrowding of the profession. Friedman and Kuznets attribute the 
deliberate restrictions of supply to the AMA and its Council on Medi-
cal Education—a claim that invited much criticism from the AMA 
(Friedman and Friedman 1998). The authors estimate that as much as 
17 percent of the excess of mean income in medicine is due to these 
restrictions on general labor supply conditions for physicians. 
In a subsequent book, Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman (1962) 
argues that doctors believe they need to control the supply of physi-
cians, and that if the supply of doctors becomes too large, their earn-
ings will fall. As a consequence, doctors claim that they will prescribe 
too many procedures in order to achieve their desired or expected 
income, and that they need that level of income in order to behave 
ethically. In other occupations that do not have this ability to control 
supply, this type of behavior would be viewed as unacceptable or ille-
gal. Friedman states that the more plausible rationale for licensing 
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for physicians—such as the ability to detect contagious diseases by a 
well-trained doctor—is important but rarely used by the profession. 
Moreover, the ability to eliminate unethical or unscrupulous 
members of any occupation is rarely used. In addition, the ability to 
have many alternative forms of medical care is limited by occupa-
tional licensing provisions. Forms of medicine that are not provided 
by physicians and that the medical establishment fi nds inappropriate 
were restricted through occupational licensure statutes or administra-
tive procedures. For example, the Flexner Report forbade chiroprac-
tors from being considered medical practitioners. 
A noted in Chapter 1, a key argument in the political economy 
approach for licensing is the term the Cadillac effect. As presented in 
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman 1962), licensing standards are set 
so high that only upper-income individuals can purchase the service. 
Lower-quality services are forbidden under the police powers of the 
state. Since licensing provides state-sanctioned monopolies, and those 
in the occupation can set the standard, the entry barrier is set high. In 
tying this analogy to the car market, if only expensive Cadillacs are 
allowed to be purchased or driven, and less expensive models, such 
as Fords and Chevys, are forbidden, then the consequence for the 
service market is that the consumer receives a very high-quality ser-
vice or nothing at all. The use of substitutes—such as, for example, 
nurse practitioners for physicians or dental hygienists for dentists—is 
forbidden or restricted by efforts from the physicians’ and dentists’ 
lobbies in the legislature (Kleiner et al. 2014). Moreover, Friedman 
(1962) also said that these practices reduce innovation, because new 
techniques or procedures are not allowed by law or administrative 
statements from the licensing board. More recently, restrictions have 
occurred because of a limitation on the number of medical residencies 
that are required to become a licensed physician (Benson et al. 2014). 
This has had a particularly negative impact on physicians from other 
countries who are applying to become physicians in the United States, 
and it has resulted in a reduction in the quantity of physicians. 
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Mortgage Brokers
Mortgage brokers are intermediaries who both match potential 
mortgage borrowers and lenders and assist them in completing the 
loan origination process for the purpose of purchasing property. Bro-
kers have typically operated as independent service providers, not as 
agents or employees of either borrowers or lenders, and they are com-
pensated by fees paid by the borrower and sometimes the lender as 
well. A little more than three decades ago, the mortgage industry was 
made up almost entirely of large integrated fi rms (banks and savings 
and loans), which managed the entire process of bringing borrowers 
and investors together. They located investors and borrowers, recom-
mended the appropriate type of loan, investigated and analyzed bor-
rowers’ credit worthiness and the value of their collateral, closed the 
loans, serviced the loans, and made payments to the investors (Jaco-
bides 2005). Mortgage broker businesses are generally small, with 
approximately 83 percent of companies licensed in only one state and 
employ between one and fi ve mortgage loan originators. Addition-
ally, 87 percent of these companies have only a single location. With 
deregulation and technological change in the home loan industry dur-
ing the 1990s, the lending process became vertically integrated so that 
mortgage brokers found borrowers and worked with them to apply 
for an appropriate loan; mortgage banks evaluated applications and 
funded them, and sometimes serviced loans. They also bundled them 
and sold them as securities (Jacobides 2005). Brokers also sometimes 
initially fund loans and resell them. 
Several factors have led to changes in the mortgage industry, 
including the rise of mortgage brokers. With the deregulation of the 
industry, there was a large proliferation in mortgage products avail-
able to subprime markets, which are more risky investments, and the 
increased emphasis on volume worked together to penetrate higher-
risk markets that had previously been ignored by the industry. Between 
1993 and 2001, subprime lenders’ share of the home purchase lending 
market grew from 1 percent to 6 percent. In lower-income house-
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holds, the subprime share was 10 percent. Also, in lower-income 
households, subprime refi nance loans made up 27 percent of home 
refi nance loans, a growth of more than 400 percent during this same 
period (Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007). 
Since this is a largely new occupation, its regulation began in the 
states only in the early 1990s. In a data collection effort and evalua-
tion of the rigor of the regulations covering mortgage brokers, Pahl 
(2007) notes that they more than doubled from 1996 to 2005. Further, 
the key factor in the regulation of the occupation is a bonding require-
ment.4 When brokers are required to have a bond of $50,000, for 
example, this typically means that they pay an annual premium, rang-
ing from several hundred to a few thousand dollars, to a surety bond 
company. It does not mean that the broker must own and place in 
trust a fi xed-income security with a market value of $50,000. Under 
specifi ed conditions of broker nonperformance of duties spelled out 
in the governing laws and regulations, third parties, such as the bro-
ker’s customers, may collect up to the amount of the bond from the 
surety company. The role of the surety company is to ensure that a 
valid claim will be promptly paid.5 If this occurs, the surety company 
will seek full compensation from the broker for the amount it paid out 
to the third party, plus expenses. The broker’s annual premium or the 
basis of his or her salary is thus a fee paid to guarantee a line of con-
tingent credit up to a legally required amount. In setting the annual 
premium it charges a broker, a surety company considers both the 
expected value of claims against the broker and the probability of col-
lecting from the broker for any amounts paid out. Consequently, the 
bond company may conduct detailed screening of applicants, similar 
to credit underwriting, before issuing the bond.
An analysis of the infl uence of having a stringent bonding 
requirement shows that tighter bonding/net worth requirements are 
also associated with lower volumes of loans processed and a higher 
percentage of high-priced loans originated. The results from Kleiner 
and Todd (2009) show that the relationship between mortgage broker 
licensing and market outcomes differs among the types of licensing 
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requirements. Specifi cally, fi nancial bonding or net worth require-
ments are associated with somewhat higher earnings; modest reduc-
tions in the number of mortgage brokers and the number of subprime 
loans originated, as well as with somewhat higher foreclosure rates; 
and higher interest rates on brokered loans. The evolution of regula-
tion in this industry has had numerous unintended side effects for 
workers in the occupation, who now receive higher pay, and for the 
consumers of their fi nancial services, who have fewer brokers and 
greater constraints on their ability to compete on price and on their 
availability (Kleiner and Todd 2009). 
Interior Designers
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Outlook 
Handbook provides a defi nition of the occupation of interior design-
ers: “Interior designers draw upon many disciplines to enhance the 
function, safety, and aesthetics of interior spaces. Their main concerns 
are with how different colors, textures, furniture, lighting, and space 
work together to meet the needs of a building’s occupants. Design-
ers plan interior spaces of almost every type of building, including 
offi ces, airport terminals, theaters, shopping malls, restaurants, hotels, 
schools, hospitals, and private residences” (BLS 2012, p. 314).
The work of interior designers overlaps and competes with that 
of engineers, architects, and other construction workers. The fear of 
remaining unregulated among these occupations that are government-
ally regulated in all states is captured in the following statement by the 
American Society of Interior Designers on its website: “It is no secret 
that some other professional groups would like to limit, control, or 
even eliminate the practice of interior design as a unique profession. 
It would be naive to believe that they are not making their cases.”6
The interior design occupation is a relatively recent addition to 
the purview of governmental oversight. The professional associa-
tion for the occupation, the American Institute of Interior Designers 
(AIID), was founded in 1931; it was not until the postwar period in 
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the 1950s that the organization had grown and sought to become reg-
ulated (ASID 2005). In 1968, voluntary certifi cation began through 
ASID, the successor organization that was designed to pave the way 
for licensing. The professional organization also began to work with 
interior design programs to strengthen curriculums and develop con-
tinuing education programs for the members of the occupation. In 
the following decade, AIID and another interior design organization 
merged to form ASID and were immediately assigned the task of 
collecting information on state regulations for the profession (ASID 
2005). In the 1980s the association began encouraging state-by-state 
registration regulations, and they signed an accord with the architects’ 
professional association to support only certifi cation, or what became 
known within the occupation as title acts. The agreement allowed 
architects to register interior designers in states with these acts and 
establish joint regulatory boards. Within this context, the agreement 
gave interior designers with expertise in the fi eld the ability to use this 
title, and those persons who did not fulfi ll the qualifi cations were for-
bidden from using the terms registered or certifi ed. In 1999, however, 
the ASID board voted to withdraw from the accord and aggressively 
pursue full occupational licensing by the states, which became known 
as practice acts. 
When government regulation of engineers evolved to include 
civil, electrical, mechanical, and industrial by the 1960s, the law 
stated that only engineers can sign off on initial and fi nal construc-
tion design and implementation. As a result, interior designers were 
relegated to an inferior position within the construction industry. 
Moreover, architects were held responsible for the development of 
the initial design of structures, which further diminished the role of 
interior designers in the eyes of the law. More generally, state and 
local governments have gradually assumed a more important role in 
determining how work is to be done in construction. The appropri-
ate types of labor inputs in construction are determined only through 
governmental statutes or administrative procedures. Working within 
the constraints of this institutional environment, interior designers 
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concluded that the only way to obtain access to certain types of work 
in this fi eld was to take steps to become a regulated occupation. With 
this in mind, they pushed for licensing in several states. However, 
they have had limited success—they have obtained full licensure in 
only three states plus the District of Columbia.
 Overall, interior designers are lobbying government on a regular 
basis to become licensed or to obtain what is called a practice act. In 
part because of push back by developers, unregulated designers, and 
consumer groups, this occupation is having a diffi cult time break-
ing out of the small number of states that have licensed its members, 
and Alabama’s Supreme Court deregulated interior designers based 
on insuffi cient evidence that it posed a threat to health and safety. 
As background, the state implemented a practice act in 2001, which 
was then ruled unconstitutional in 2007 by the state supreme court. 
If a practice act increases wages for interior designers, we would 
then expect to see a substantial increase in wages between 2002 and 
2007 in Alabama. For example, interior designers in Alabama saw 
a wage increase of 46 percent under a practice act. By comparison, 
the national mean wage increased 17 percent over the same period of 
time (Alexander et al. 2009). These gains explain why the members 
of ASID continue to push for legislation to regulate the occupation. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Specialized workers have long attempted to limit competition and 
set standards for entry into an occupation. Friedman (1962) notes that 
the process can be traced to the time of ancient Greece and the Hippo-
cratic Oath, and that it puts limits on entry into medicine. Also, there 
are many similarities between unions and occupational licensing. In 
medieval times, guilds also attempted to limit entry into occupations 
with the help of local political leaders. The movement from a nation 
of shopkeepers and small fi rms operating in local labor markets to 
the Industrial Revolution resulted in a decline in the system of guilds, 
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as manufacturing fi rms largely trained workers for specifi c jobs that 
were required for large assembly line tasks, but with little need for 
the government to set standards. With more growth in the service 
economy, workers in the service sector have formed associations that 
lobby the state legislatures and governors in the United States. 
The outcome has been growth in the regulated sector of the labor 
market. Physicians, mortgage brokers, and interior designers are at 
different stages of occupational regulation and licensure. In the case 
of physicians, the occupation has been able to largely control the 
market for new doctors since the early twentieth century. Mortgage 
brokers have been captive to large swings in the housing market. It is 
an emerging occupation that has seen state-level regulations, such as 
the required bonding of practitioners, and an infl uence on wages and 
prices for the consumers of their services. 
Finally, interior designers have been trying to get on equal foot-
ing with engineers and architects by seeking state-by-state licensing. 
Thus far they have had only modest success in achieving full licens-
ing in the United States. In general, interior designers have promoted 
occupational licensing with much less input by the public. In addi-
tion, this curious standard-setting legal institution seems to behave 
differently in different occupations and is similar to guilds because 
they had different tactics in different countries and across varying 
industries and towns. “To paraphrase Tolstoy, all unlicensed occupa-
tions are alike; each licensed occupation is licensed in its own way.”7 
Notes
 1.  For a link to the entire program, see http://vimeo.com/26912276 
(accessed July 7, 2015).
 2.  The Taft-Hartley amendments to the act do, however, allow for unions 
to be voted out, and in right-to-work states, individuals do not have 
to join a union or pay union dues. When a union wins an election at 
an establishment, it is the exclusive representative of the workers for a 
minimum of one year.
 3. This policy of giving control of regulation to an association has occurred 
in a number of occupations. For example, physical therapists boards 
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have largely followed the directives of the association in increasing the 
requirements of newly licensed physical therapists to a doctoral degree. 
 4. For background on the market for surety bonds in general and mort-
gage broker surety bonds in particular, see www.jwsuretybonds.com 
(accessed July 14, 2015).
 5. Surety companies investigate the validity of claims before paying out. 
We are referring here to claims they consider valid.
 6.  See http://asidcanv.org/students/student-legislative-resources/ (accessed 
July 14, 2015). 
 7.  Charles Wheelan, from the Harris School of Public Policy at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, used this statement in a blurb he wrote for my book 
Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies (Upjohn 
Institute 2013).
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Chapter 3
The Costs, Mobility, and Quality 
of Occupational Licensing Services
Determining the desirability of government intervention there-
fore requires a careful assessment of the costs of imperfect mar-
kets relative to the costs and benefi ts of imperfect regulation, 
with full recognition of the inevitable shortcomings in each.
—Nancy Rose (2014, p. 21)
Occupational licensing is a growing labor market institution in the 
United States. For example, during the 2012–2013 legislative ses-
sions, at least seven new occupations were licensed, ranging from 
scrap metal recyclers in Louisiana, therapeutic shoe fi tters in Ala-
bama, to body artists in the District of Columbia. On the other hand, 
during the same time period, three governors (from Idaho, Iowa, and 
Indiana) vetoed legislation from their own party’s dominated legisla-
ture that would have licensed several new occupations (Associated 
Press 2013; Branstad 2013; Reynolds 2015).
What might be the aggregate costs of licensing in the U.S. econ-
omy? One measure of an upper bound can be calculated as follows. 
There are approximately 38 million licensed workers, with average 
annual earnings of about $41,000 in 2010. Using a standard economic 
model, at the high end of the estimates of the impact, occupational 
licensing can result in 2.8 million fewer jobs with an annual cost 
to consumers of $203 billion (Kleiner 2015; Kleiner, Krueger, and 
Mas 2011). This amount is a transfer of income from consumers to 
licensed workers. If consumers are middle-income individuals, and 
licensed workers are well above average, this could result in a real-
location of resources from middle-income to higher-income practi-
tioners. In addition, there would be lost output as well as potential 
misallocation effects from the misuse of labor resources related to 
these government-mandated regulations (Schmidt 2012). The costs 
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could include using government-mandated labor resources relative 
to economically effi cient inputs in the production of labor services 
(Kleiner 2013).1 
Without doing a detailed analysis at the occupation-by-occupation
and state, county, or national level, it is diffi cult to say which occupa-
tions can be justifi ed based on quality considerations, though when 
studies have been conducted they have found a number of cases where 
occupational licensing reduces employment and increases prices but 
does not result in better services (Kleiner 2013). For example, Kleiner 
and Kudrle (2000) fi nd that tougher occupational licensing of dentists 
does not lead to improved measured dental outcomes of patients, but 
it results in higher prices of certain services, likely because there are 
fewer dentists.2 
Overall, current analytical research shows few signifi cant bene-
fi ts of occupational regulation for consumers and no major effect on 
the quality of service received by consumers or on the demand for the 
service, other than through potential price effects. 
As was noted in Chapter 2, there was little occupational licens-
ing throughout much of the nineteenth century (Langford 2009). The 
licensing of occupations in the United States has evolved mainly at 
the state level. As mentioned earlier, the major Supreme Court case 
that established the right of states to grant licenses was the Dent v. 
West Virginia 129 U.S. 114 decision in 1889. The decision established 
state law as the appropriate venue to deal with protecting the health, 
welfare, or safety of citizens. There was a steady increase in the 
regulation of occupations in the United States, with 30 occupations 
licensed in 1920, including more than 2,800 statutory provisions in 
the different states (Greene 1969). At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, occupations such as doctors, dentists, and lawyers attained 
full licensure in most states. The duration of how long an occupation 
has been licensed often is a good indicator to how economically suc-
cessful the occupation has become over time (Han and Kleiner 2015). 
With new information technology, consumers who use compa-
nies like Uber have the ability to directly contact suppliers of these 
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services, and they have lots of information about the driver. As a 
result, the value of occupational licenses has been questioned. Uber, 
an app-based transportation network, serves as a taxi company. The 
company provides transportation services without the benefi t of a 
typical occupational license. Customers and drivers rate each other 
immediately after a trip, and this information is shared with new 
potential customers and drivers. The drivers, who function as inde-
pendent contractors, are vetted through the company and have private 
driver’s licenses, but unlike most cab drivers they are not required to 
have a taxi or chauffeur’s license through the state, county, or city. 
Consequently, they do not pay these licensing fees to the government, 
and Uber is not subject to other regulations of taxis, such as metered 
fares and guaranteed coverage of certain destinations. Many custom-
ers seem to enjoy the benefi ts of competition with conventional cabs, 
such as the chance of lower prices, and in some cities Uber drivers 
almost serve as the family chauffeur (Kapp 2014). On the other hand, 
taxi companies and drivers and government offi cials have expressed 
public safety concerns about Uber’s lack of regulation, with some 
cities, such as Portland, Oregon, attempting to ban Uber drivers in 
the city. The fate of Uber and similar services, even as they continue 
to grow, will likely be determined through the courts and, potentially, 
legislation. 
Unfortunately, it is diffi cult to ascertain what share of the work-
force requires a license to do their jobs or how this varies across states, 
since this information has not been tracked in government surveys. 
In 2013, however, Harris Poll Interactive, in a project for the Insti-
tute for Justice funded by the Templeton Foundation, conducted such 
a survey of approximately 10,000 workers that had been patterned 
on earlier smaller-scale surveys (Kleiner and Krueger 2013; Kleiner 
and Vorotnikov 2015). The Harris Poll found that 28.43 percent of 
the respondents answered that they were either licensed or certifi ed. 
Approximately 6.75 percent said that individuals who did not have 
a license could do the work, which is the defi nition of government 
certifi cation. Another 1.79 percent said that all who worked would 
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eventually be required to be certifi ed or licensed, bringing the total 
that are or eventually must be licensed or certifi ed by government to 
30.22 percent.3 Table 3.1 shows the education, testing, and internship 
requirements for those facing licensing or certifi cation. 
These huge variations in licensing requirements across states 
often have little relationship to the ability of the individuals to do 
the tasks related to the occupation. The use of licensing varies for the 
same occupation. For example, only 7 states license dental assistants, 
and 13 states license locksmiths. Iowa requires 490 days to become a 
licensed cosmetologist, but the national average is 372 days, and New 
York and Massachusetts require only 233 days (Carpenter et al. 2012). 
In addition, occupational licensing is often not tied to issues of clear 
health and safety concerns at the point of service. To illustrate, Michi-
gan requires 1,460 days to become an athletic trainer but only 26 days 
to be licensed as an emergency medical technician. These examples 
provide some illustrations of the variance in training licensed workers 
across states and licensing occupations within states. However, there 
does not appear to be a rational approach in terms of the health and 
safety of the public—which is the primary stated purpose of this kind 
of regulation—regarding why some occupations are licensed and oth-
Table 3.1  Percentage of Workers Who Require Specifi c Education and 
Testing to Become Licensed or Certifi ed
SOURCE: Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015). Harris conducted the survey in early and 
mid-2013. Individuals aged 18 or older who were in the labor force were eligible for 
the survey. A total of 9,850 individuals were interviewed. Kleiner and Vorotnikov 
limit their analysis to those who were at the time of the survey employed or had a job 
during the previous 12 months. 
Licensed workers 
facing requirement
Certifi ed workers 
facing requirement
High school diploma 75.1 66.6
College degree 47.7 28.5
Pass an exam 88.9 85.9
Performance test 67.8 61.1
Continuing education 67.8 52.9
Internship 46.5 35.3
License/certifi cate renewal test 34.5 33.9
Kleiner 2015.indb   28 11/23/2015   1:34:22 PM
The Costs, Mobility, and Quality of Occupational Licensing Services   29
ers are not, and why some require long training programs and exams 
while others require relatively little time in the classroom. Although 
these differences may in part refl ect the industry and human capital 
characteristics of the state, they may also refl ect the ability of occu-
pational associations to get licensing for many more of their workers. 
Figure 3.1 shows a map of the number of states that license various 
occupations by high, medium, and low. For example, Iowa has twice 
the percentage of licensed workers as Rhode Island, New Hampshire, 
or Indiana. Does the huge variation in the occupational regulation 
system shown in Figure 3.1 refl ect the equity and effi ciency trade-offs 
of this type of regulation? Beyond the characteristics of the state, the 
industry composition of the state may help determine the percent of 
the workforce that is licensed. Nevertheless, the state-specifi c politi-
cal forces may also be an important factor in the large variation in the 
number of workers who have attained an occupational license. 
Figure 3.1  Share of Workforce Licensed, by State (%)
NOTE: The three categories were constructed to contain roughly the same number of 
states.
SOURCE: Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015) based on an analysis of data from a Harris 
poll of 9,850 individuals conducted in the fi rst half of 2013.
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INFLUENCE ON WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
The impact of being in a licensed occupation on the hourly 
earnings of universally regulated occupations relative to similar un-
licensed individuals has recently seen considerable research and 
analysis. For the occupations examined in the literature, being in a 
licensed occupation appears to increase earnings by 10–15 percent, 
which is at the lower bound of the impact of other labor market 
institutions, such as unions (Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013). For 
individuals whose occupations are licensed in some states and not 
in others, the impact of being licensed is much smaller, about 5–8 
percent (Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2015; Gittleman and Kleiner, 
forthcoming; Kleiner 2006). 
Licensing generally increases the economic status of practitioners 
(Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2015). Policymakers need to examine 
whether this is either a result of increased quality caused by greater 
training and higher quality services or a consequence of restricting 
competition by limiting entry into the occupations, or both. In addi-
tion, the evidence using federal government surveys suggests that 
the benefi ts of licensing are mainly for individuals who are relatively 
well off (Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2015). 
A study of occupational laws for 10 major licensed occupations in 
the U.S. labor market estimates the infl uence of time from the passage 
of a law to its infl uence in the labor market. Time from the passage of 
occupational licensing laws, called duration, is important when ana-
lyzing occupational licensing because states often enact “grandfather 
clauses” that protect existing workers, and new workers have higher 
entry standards than existing workers, thus increasing the costs to 
new entrants. This process limits the supply of labor, and those in the 
occupation can gain economic rents. Using historical data on the year 
that an occupation was licensed by a state and the data available from 
the American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey 
from 1950 to 2010, Han and Kleiner (2015) develop estimates of the 
impact of licensing duration on wages. Their estimates suggest that 
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it takes at least 10 years to realize the full economic wage effects of 
occupational licensing. 
There is considerable variation in the effects of regulation. For 
the higher-education and higher-income occupations working mainly 
in the quasi-private sector, such as physicians, dentists, and lawyers, 
licensing appears to have large effects through either limiting entry or 
restricting movement between the states. However, for occupations 
such as teachers, nurses, and cosmetologists, the impact of licensing 
on earnings is murky, with some studies fi nding small effects and 
others fi nding none (Kleiner 2006, 2013). However, for teachers and 
nurses, licensing reduces interstate migration (Johnson and Kleiner 
2015). The infl uence of licensing on employment growth is more 
gradual, but the fi ndings suggest that licensed occupations grow more 
slowly in states that license than in those that do not (Kleiner 2006). 
INFLUENCE ON GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY
In the last 20 years, occupational licensing has been moving in 
the opposite direction relative to gross interstate migration (Johnson 
and Kleiner 2015). Figure 3.2 shows that beginning in the mid-1980s, 
interstate migration started to decline as the percent of the workforce 
that have occupational licenses continued to grow. Several stud-
ies have documented the general decline of Americans’ movement 
across states. To explain the decline, these studies often use models 
that include improved information by migrants of job opportunities, 
cost of living, and other amenities. Consequently, there is less return 
migration and cross-state movement because information in the labor 
market is much better than in the past. The primary reason for this 
improvement is the growth of the Internet and information available 
to potential movers. Despite its steep downward trend, migration 
within the United States remains higher than that within most other 
developed countries (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012; Molloy, 
Smith, and Wozniak 2011). However, recent empirical evidence sug-
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gests that occupational licensing has contributed to this decline and 
has produced the following results: workers not being able to take 
jobs that they want without signifi cantly higher regulatory adminis-
trative costs, and consumers not being able to take advantage of more 
services at the lowest cost in rapidly growing areas (Moretti 2012). 
This has become a particularly important issue for military families, 
who are often moved across state lines —10 times more than the aver-
age American. If the trailing partner is licensed, he or she must spend 
a considerable amount of time and money to seek reaccreditation 
(U.S. Executive Offi ce of the President 2013, 2015). 
Occupational licensing can deter geographical movements in 
several ways. First, under licensing statutes and administrative pro-
cesses, investments for entry into an occupation are more diffi cult 
(especially in the absence of reciprocity, which are agreements among 
states to accept each other’s practitioners). The requirements com-
monly involve qualifi cation criteria, passing exams, and in many 
cases, the engagement in continuing professional development activi-
Figure 3.2  Occupational Licensing and Interstate Migration, 1950–2008
SOURCE: Johnson and Kleiner (2015).
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ties (an investment that continues throughout one’s career). Second, 
in many professional labor markets, practicing the occupation also 
involves location-specifi c investments, such as developing social 
capital in local reputation, an additional cost that the worker has to 
bear if he or she decides to migrate (Pashigian 1979, 1980). Finally, 
if a worker in a particular licensed occupation moves from a highly 
regulated labor market to a less regulated one, there is the possibil-
ity of a wage penalty if the wage premium associated with licensing 
is higher in the home state compared to that in the destination. As a 
result, one would expect licensing to add to the cost of mobility and 
to be inversely related to labor movements. However, to the extent 
that educational and other regulation-related requirements are harmo-
nized, individuals would move to take advantage of economic oppor-
tunities (e.g., in the form of a wage premium). Further, the ease with 
which one can access information on entry to the profession (e.g., 
procedures to follow for recognition of qualifi cations and residency 
requirements) also is likely to reduce the cost of movement that is 
taken on by the individual. Conversely, tougher licensing in the host 
state would deter outmigration because it is unlikely that individuals 
in occupations that are more heavily regulated in a state are likely to 
receive a wage offer that is high enough to encourage movement out 
of those states. 
Within this model, occupational licensing has been cited as a pol-
icy that not only may distort the operation of labor markets (Friedman 
1962; Rottenberg 1980) but also may act as a deterrent to labor mobil-
ity. Holen (1965) is among the fi rst policy studies to analyze the effects 
of U.S. state licensing arrangements and practices in the health care 
professions, focusing on interstate mobility and the allocation of pro-
fessional labor resources. The author fi nds that the empirical evidence 
is consistent with the view that professional licensing arrangements 
and practices in dentistry and law restrict interstate mobility among 
dentists and lawyers and distort the allocation of professional person-
nel in these fi elds. Follow-up work along the same lines by Pashigian 
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(1979) shows that occupational licensing reduces the mobility of indi-
viduals across state lines. Kleiner, Gay, and Greene (1982) fi nd that 
restrictive licensing may operate as a barrier to mobility, causing a 
misallocation of labor resources across states, with increased earnings 
for the practitioners in those states with the most restrictive barriers. 
Reexamining the issue with more current data, Tenn (2001) fi nds 
that supply restrictions cause equilibrium wages to rise because of 
these supply changes, which results in higher-quality workers with 
presumably higher wages. Drawing on prior research by Pashigian 
(1979) and Kleiner, Gay, and Greene (1982), Tenn examines the 
infl uence of licensing for attorneys, an occupation that has long been 
licensed in the United States. He fi nds that migration rates and licens-
ing statutes jointly have signifi cant infl uence in explaining wages and 
concludes that both these issues need to be addressed as part of the 
analysis of the impact of occupational licensing. 
Federman, Harrington, and Krynski (2006) also examine issues 
for lower-income practitioners who are covered by licensing laws. 
The authors estimate the effects of licensing regulations on the entry 
of manicurist immigrants into the occupation. Their fi ndings show 
that the level of migration is impeded by the existence and restrictive-
ness (in terms of minimum entry standards) of state licensing regu-
lations. In particular, they estimate that the requirement to have an 
additional 100 hours of training reduces the likelihood of having a 
Vietnamese manicurist by 4.5 percent, while states requiring some 
level of English profi ciency were 5.7 percentage points less likely 
to have a Vietnamese manicurist. Consequently, policies that affect 
migration are not limited to just high-income individuals. 
Taken together, these studies support the view that regulation 
may limit the number of practitioners in a nation and that a policy 
of reducing barriers to interstate migration would provide benefi ts to 
workers and consumers. If this is the case, then nationwide endorse-
ment through policies that do not limit entry requirements could 
alleviate uneven geographic distribution of licensed practitioners 
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and ease possible location-specifi c mismatches. Second, nationwide 
endorsement, which is the acceptance of the credentials of those from 
another state, represents a potential policy reform since the proposal 
is often supported by a majority of the members of a profession rela-
tive to deregulation. The ability to move across state lines and legally 
work would allow individuals to more easily go where there are jobs 
with fewer impediments for movement across state lines. This is par-
ticularly important since the growth in wage variation across geo-
graphic areas may make it more advantageous to move across state 
lines (Moretti 2012). Finally, barriers to interstate migration may not 
allow labor markets to function in their most effi cient manner.
INFLUENCE ON PRICES
The practices that raise wages and prices include restrictions 
on interstate mobility, advertising, and other commercial practices 
(Bond et al. 1980; Feldman and Begun 1978; Shepard 1978). The 
impact of licensing-related practices on prices ranges from 5 to 33 
percent, depending on the type of occupational practice and location 
(Kleiner 2006).4 For example, the infl uence of the lack of reciprocity 
in dentistry raises prices by 15 percent (Shepard 1978). Restrictions 
on the number of hygienists that a dentist may employ increase the 
average price of a dental visit by 7 percent (Liang and Ogur 1987). 
Restrictions on nurse practitioners’ tasks relative to physicians’ raise 
prices of well-child exams by 10 percent (Kleiner et al. 2014). If the 
price of a well-child exam is approximately $100, and there were 
approximately 60,000,000 medical visits in 2012, then the potential 
cost savings of relaxing these licensing requirements could result in 
approximately $600,000,000 per year for just this one medical proce-
dure (Kleiner et al. 2014). 
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OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AS SOCIAL INSURANCE
The rationale for these effects on prices could be that govern-
ment regulations reduce uncertainty or the likelihood of poor service, 
or “lemons,” in the market (Akerlof 1970). A review of the body of 
theory from experimental economics and psychology shows that con-
sumers value the reduction in downside risk more than they value 
the benefi ts of a positive outcome (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
1991). This consumer preference for reducing the risk of a highly 
negative outcome has been called “loss aversion,” which is an ele-
ment of the “prospect theory” developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). For example, social welfare may be increased substantially 
by minimizing the likelihood of a poor diagnosis as a consequence 
of going to an incompetent physician, because the incompetent phy-
sicians have been weeded out as a result of the monitoring effects 
of licensing. Consequently, occupational licensing may also reduce 
patients’ perceived benefi ts of receiving nonstandard but potentially 
highly effective treatment from an unlicensed practitioner of nontra-
ditional medicine. Using the power of the state to both limit the down-
side risk of poor quality care and reduce the possibility of an upside 
benefi t may be a trade-off that maximizes consumer utility or wel-
fare. Evidence of the acceptance of this trade-off can be found in the 
growth of occupational licensing in many countries during the past 
century (Kleiner 2006). To an extent, according to Kahneman and 
Tversky, licensing could be perceived as a form of social insurance 
that costs consumers more because it protects them against potential 
downside losses.
As a consequence, consumers perceive the service to be of higher 
quality because of licensing, and they demand more of the service, 
which drives up the price. On the other hand, regulations could be a 
way for current practitioners, by limiting entry or restricting informa-
tion on prices in the market for the service, to raise their own wages 
(Friedman 1962; Kleiner 2015). If government grants a monopoly 
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in the market for the service, the long-term impact would be lower-
quality services, a misallocation of resources, and higher prices. From 
the empirical studies of licensing, it is diffi cult to tell which of these 
effects dominates in the determination of price increases for licensed 
services. However, a consequence for regulated occupations with 
high incomes, such dentists and lawyers, is the ability to raise prices 
through the impacts of regulation, restricting the supply of practition-
ers and controlling the allocation of work to them relative to unregu-
lated workers within the industry. The monopoly power granted and 
enforced by the state may shift income from lower-income custom-
ers to higher-income practitioners, which may contribute to greater 
income inequality. 
An alternative explanation for these price increases that is often 
given by the occupations’ professional associations is that the method 
of delivering services for the profession has changed over time, and 
that allowing a group of experts to supervise, govern, and recom-
mend changes would standardize the practices and reduce uncer-
tainty in the minds of consumers. In the Supreme Court case North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Com-
mission (2014), argued in October 2014 and decided in February 
2015 in favor of the Federal Trade Commission, it was suggested 
that when members of the profession are on the licensing board, they 
attempt to capture work from other occupations. In this case it was 
the work of unlicensed teeth whiteners who were working in malls 
and spas selling teeth whitening products. The dental licensing board 
of North Carolina claimed that individuals who were not dentists and 
sold over-the-counter teeth whitening kits were practicing dentistry 
without an occupational license. When the dental board sent cease-
and-desist letters to the mall vendors, the Federal Trade Commission 
viewed such an action as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In 
the oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Associate Justice Breyer 
expressed concern about bureaucrats making decisions in areas where 
only trained professionals are knowledgeable and have competence 
in making appropriate decisions (Liptak 2014). Although a regulatory 
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board consists of licensed practitioners who possess specifi c knowl-
edge of the tasks needed to perform the job, it can lead to perverse 
incentives in which the interests of the practitioners are in confl ict 
with the interests of the public. In North Carolina, six of the eight 
board members were practicing dentists and elected by other practic-
ing dentists, not chosen by the governor, legislature, or other offi cials 
responsible to the public. While the dentists have an interest in exclu-
sively reserving the right to sell a profi table service, the public has an 
interest in having access to a suffi cient number of individuals to do 
the job at a reasonable price and at an acceptable level of quality. This 
Supreme Court case illustrates how occupational regulation can lead 
to confl icts over who can legally provide services to the public. In this 
case it was the relatively well-off dentists taking work and income 
from relatively lower-income sales representatives of teeth whitening 
products and services. 
As the price of dental services goes up, so does average quality 
per practitioner, which is seen in higher-quality services as refl ected 
in higher prices. By having better dentists through more training, 
the patient is likely to receive better care but at a higher price. Fur-
ther, capital expenditures, through more sophisticated and expensive 
equipment, have increased the required return on investment for 
either a sole practitioner or for a large provider of medical services 
(Cutler and Berndt 2001). On the other hand, standardization through 
occupational licensing may also stifl e innovation or new techniques 
of practice by the licensing board by not allowing new procedures or 
competitors to be introduced. 
INFLUENCE ON QUALITY OF SERVICES 
Many studies have attempted to develop methods to estimate the 
infl uence of licensing on quality or the demand for licensed services. 
On this issue there are a disproportionate number of studies on regu-
lation in dentistry, in part because for many years dentistry had large 
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variations in state licensing requirements (Shepard 1978). Moreover, 
outcome measures like cavities were easy to identify and quantify. 
Dollar values across political jurisdictions were generally available. 
For example, Holen (1978) fi nds that licensing reduces the likelihood 
of adverse outcomes and increases the quality of care, but Carroll and 
Gaston (1981) and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) fi nd no effect. Since 
Holen and Carrol and Gaston use the same data source gathered from 
the Naval recruits, the differences in the outcomes rely largely on 
different measures of outcomes. Holen uses a measure of the condi-
tion of the teeth itself, such as cavities or broken or chipped teeth. On 
the other hand, Carroll and Gaston use measures of an oral hygiene 
index, which focuses on the soft tissue and includes measures such as 
gum disease. Kleiner and Kudrle use measures of dental health that 
incorporate Holen’s measure, as well as those by Carrol and Gaston, 
and they use a “quality-adjusted” pass rate as well as statutory factors 
in each state. Kleiner and Kudrle’s analysis uses a broader number of 
controls for economic and demographic factors. With these updated 
and more refi ned measures of dental condition, the characteristics of 
the individuals in the study, and measures of regulation by the states, 
they fi nd no impact of tougher state licensing laws and administrative 
procedures on measures of dental condition. This suggests that occu-
pational licensing generally has little to no effect on outcomes, even 
using point of service delivery.
Studies of other occupations, from construction contractors to 
teachers, suggest that tougher forms of regulation have murky effects 
on quality or the demand for the service (Angrist and Guryan 2003; 
Kleiner and Petree 1988; Maurizi 1980; Shapiro 1986). For contrac-
tors, Maurizi fi nds that allowing lower-quality contractors to obtain 
licenses would reduce the quality-enhancing impacts of this type of 
labor market regulation. In education, the growth of occupational 
licensing over the past two decades has resulted in uncertain effects 
on student test scores, a generally recognized measure of quality in 
education. Carroll and Gaston (1981), in the case studies for seven 
widely varying licensed occupations, fi nd that licensing has either a 
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negative or no impact on the quality of services received by consum-
ers. In another study on physicians, Paul (1982) states that “licens-
ing legislation was the result of organized physicians employing the 
political system for limiting entry and the concomitant increasing of 
return to incumbent medical practitioners” (p. 27). However, using 
a theoretical model of the impacts of licensing, Shapiro argues that 
licensing should be thought of by income segments of the consumer 
market for licensed services. The argument is that wealthier consum-
ers who value quality more highly gain the benefi ts, but lower-income 
individuals with lesser relative demand for quality services would 
lose from tougher licensing standards by having less access to the 
service (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000; Shapiro 1986). 
Another factor in the growth of the demand for licensing is its 
disproportionate prevalence in medical service delivery, an industry 
that has been growing rapidly with an aging population. Consumption 
of medical services grew 25 percent as a percentage of all consumer 
purchases from 1984 to 1995 (Ford and Ginsburg 2001). Moreover, 
the prices of medical services have risen more rapidly than overall 
prices in the economy (Triplett 2001), and about 76 percent of non-
physican services include individuals who have a license (Kleiner et 
al. 2014). An important factor in the growth of this sector has been 
that technological change has grown much more rapidly in the medi-
cal industry than in other services in the economy, which has led to the 
need for more standardized labor inputs (Fixler and Ginsburg 2001). 
Licensing may have fulfi lled this demand for a minimum requirement 
of standardization as a complimentary input to the rapid technological 
change in this industry. 
In one of the few fi eld studies of the impacts of licensing on qual-
ity, the Federal Trade Commission examined the relationship between 
licensing and the overuse of services (Phelan 1974). In this study, 
televisions with known defects were used to determine the incidents 
of oversubscribed services in three locations: 1) Washington, D.C., 
which did not require a license for television repair; 2) New Orleans, 
Louisiana, which licenses the individuals; and 3) San Francisco, Cali-
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fornia, which licenses the facility but not the individual. One of the 
fi ndings was that the Louisiana licensing law does not protect the 
consumer from what has been defi ned as “parts fraud” (Phelan 1974). 
The estimates from the study found that parts fraud was about 20 per-
cent in San Francisco, compared to about 50 percent in New Orleans 
and Washington, D.C. Therefore, licensing individuals may not be 
an optimal method of consumer protection relative to no licensing or 
regulating a business. Although policymakers may wish occupational 
licensing to be a method of enhancing quality, there is little evidence 
to support this assumption for consumers, even at point of sale. If, 
however, licensing reduces the worst outcomes, such as a furnace 
exploding because a licensed boilermaker had the training to detect 
the problem, then the regulations may be perceived as insurance that 
reduces downside risks (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
In a fi eld study on optical care conducted by the Federal Trade 
Commission, Kwoka (1984) fi nds that the average quality of eye care 
is lower in regions with restrictions on advertising. Moreover, Liang 
and Ogur (1987) fi nd in an additional fi eld study that licensing rules 
that restrict the use of dental hygienists and assistants increased the 
average price of a dental visit by 11 percent in 1970 and 7 percent 
in 1982. They suggest that if these price increases do not produce 
any quality benefi ts, then consumers are worse off (Liang and Ogur 
1987). There could be benefi ts of such regulations if exams by higher-
quality dentists lead to the discovery of dental problems that, if left 
untreated, could result in teeth and gum deterioration, which could 
lead to a decline in overall health. Lacking in the licensing literature 
is the attribution of the total increase in the price of the service due 
to regulation and economic gains, where part of this increase could 
refl ect an increase in quality or a greater demand for the service with 
a resulting increase in prices.
 Another method of determining whether licensing has an impact 
on the quality of a service is through the premiums charged to indi-
viduals in regulated and unregulated states. The rationale for this 
evaluation is that if licensing serves to keep out incompetent potential 
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practitioners relative to states that do not have licensing, then there 
would be a reduction in lawsuits for the service, which could lead to 
lower premiums. One of the main private and social functions of the 
insurance industry is to assess and monetize risk. A way to evaluate 
whether licensing has an infl uence on reducing risk is to examine if 
insurance premiums are reduced based on the licensing coverage in a 
state. In discussions with offi cials at a major national insurance com-
pany, their view was that licensing makes an occupation more visible 
and sets up rules and regulations that make lawsuits easier to fi le. The 
impact of this more structured procedure would drive up premiums. 
The greater visibility for the occupation and the greater ability to fi le 
lawsuits because of licensing’s structure compensate for any potential 
benefi ts from the quality aspects of licensing from the perspective of 
the insurance industry. Overall, there is little evidence that licensing 
greatly improves the overall quality of services received when one 
also takes into account the number and quality of reduced services 
received by those at the lowest part of the income distribution. 
Overall, the analysis of demand and quality does not show sig-
nifi cant benefi ts of occupational regulation. There is little evidence 
that occupational regulation has a major effect on either the quality of 
service received by consumers or on the demand for the service other 
than through potential price effects. Another aspect of licensing that 
is often overlooked is its infl uence on innovation. Some have argued 
that board members of large corporations should be licensed (Free-
man 2008). Although in some cases it may reduce problems related to 
ethical behavior or enhance skill sets, it could reduce innovation by 
prohibiting outstanding entrepreneurs. For example, Bill Gates and 
Steve Jobs did not fi nish college and would be ineligible to be on 
licensed boards of directors, but they nonetheless enhanced innova-
tion and creativity in information technology through their technical 
and managerial skills and created some of the highest value-added 
innovations in the last 30 years.
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THE NET EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
There is no assurance that the services actually received by con-
sumers are positively related with the quality of the inputs, and the 
distinction between the number of inputs employed and the quality 
of service outputs received may not be consistent. For example, a 
less competent dentist may require multiple attempts to fi ll a tooth to 
the same standard that a more skilled dentist could accomplish once. 
There is little to no published research on the relationship between 
performance on the licensing exam and an individual’s ability to 
perform on the job. Even for occupations with lower general educa-
tion requirements, such as cosmetology, job-specifi c training often is 
costly and sometimes longer than one year, with an apprenticeship 
followed by a state-licensing exam. These requirements may result in 
fewer practitioners, and lower-income and lower-educated practition-
ers may result in reduced access to the services provided. This can 
result in a distribution of resources from lower-income consumers, 
who now have to pay higher prices or have less access to a service 
such as haircuts or dental services. For example, an unlicensed res-
taurant server would have to pay more to a licensed dental hygienist 
or dentist for his dental health. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examines the curious issue of occupational licens-
ing from a number of different perspectives and has fi ve main fi nd-
ings. First, occupational licensing raises wages among those who 
have attained a license, but less so for those who are just covered 
by a licensing statute. In addition, the longer an occupation has been 
licensed, the greater the infl uence of the regulations on wage growth 
and employment changes. Second, occupational regulation reduces 
the interstate migration of several regulated occupations, such as pub-
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lic school teachers and lawyers. A consequence is a potential geo-
graphic misallocation of labor resources because this form of regu-
lation reduces the ability of licensed workers to move across state 
lines to potential jobs. Third, the evidence suggests that occupational 
licensing raises the prices of regulated services. Fourth, these regula-
tions may serve as a form of social insurance that may reduce the 
worst outcomes of certain types of risky services, such as medicine, 
yet provide some assurance by the government that the regulated ser-
vices are of minimal quality. Unfortunately, the evidence thus far does 
not support the assertion that more heavily regulated services are of 
higher overall quality. In addition, the evidence about the infl uence of 
occupational licensing on average quality is murky at best. Whether 
occupational licensing enhances quality depends on the situation or 
task, and the profession that is being regulated. 
Fifth and fi nally, the net effect of occupational licensing is that 
it enhances wages and benefi ts, raises prices, and reduces interstate 
migration; however, it has no measurable effect on the quality of the 
services provided to consumers. This is an issue that is presented from 
a perspective of licensing as a way to limit supply and restrict entry 
and thereby drive up wages. All these issues have contributed to the 
labor market institution of occupational licensing being a stealth form 
of regulation that has unusual and curious effects on the guild-ridden 
labor market, consumers, and the public.
Notes
 1.  A basic examination of the national costs of licensing could be devel-
oped as follows: suppose that the entire 15 percent wage premium 
for licensing mentioned above is from economic rents (as opposed to 
enhanced human capital), and further assume that labor supply is per-
fectly elastic and the labor demand elasticity is 0.5 and there are 38 mil-
lion licensed workers (Hamermesh 1993). As a consequence, the impact 
would be in 2.8 million fewer jobs with an annual cost to consumers of 
$203 billion.
 2.  For additional examples see Carroll and Gaston (1981).
 3.  This value is lower than the 38 percent found by Kleiner and Krueger 
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(2013) in the survey conducted by Westat in 2008. This difference may 
refl ect the larger sample size of the Harris data, which is almost four 
times the size of the Westat sample, the sample selection criteria, or the 
method of data collection (phone survey versus an online survey). In 
addition, there was no validity check on the quality of the responses by 
occupation in the Harris data. The number of state-level observations 
varies from 146 in Tennessee to 222 in the District of Columbia, and 
averages 193 per state.
 4.  See Kleiner (2006, Table 3.3) for a full listing of price effects of occupa-
tional licensing. 
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Chapter 4
Battles among Licensed Occupations
In the unionized part of the construction industry, there is sometimes 
a dispute over which craft is allocated a task on a job site. Unions 
and arbitrators decide which union will get to do the work of, say, 
building a wall. Should the occupation be the members of the brick-
layers union, the laborers’ union, or the carpenters’ union? Similar to 
these jurisdictional disputes in the trade union sector in construction, 
occupational regulation has similar disputes in, for example, health 
care over who should provide well-child physical exams. Should it be 
the physician, physician’s assistant, the nurse practitioner, or another 
specially trained health care provider? In other parts of construction 
work, should architects or interior designers provide the blueprints for 
the interior of a nursing home? When the work is very similar, should 
physical therapists or occupational therapists have the legal right to 
help, for example, disabled individuals within their homes?
HEALTH CARE
Understanding the consequences of contested terrains in regu-
lated markets is particularly important in the health sector because it 
is especially subject to occupational regulation by the government. 
This sector is a particularly important economic factor. In 2009 the 
health sector accounted for about 18 percent of U.S. gross domestic 
product, and expenditures on provider services represented about 21 
percent of total expenditures on health services (Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services 2014). The health sector is also central in 
terms of employment; in 2012 it employed about 11.7 percent of all 
workers in the United States, and the share of workers in the health 
sector is expected to grow over the next 10 years (BLS 2014). At 
the same time, the core health occupations (e.g., physicians, nurses, 
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and dentists) are universally licensed, and over three-fourths of non-
physician health workers also work in licensed occupations (Kleiner 
and Park 2010). If regulations have even small effects on wages and 
prices, then the aggregate cost of the regulations could be large in 
absolute dollars. The implications of proposed regulations are cur-
rently on the agenda in many states. The National Conference of State 
Legislatures reports that across the 54 state/territorial governments it 
monitors, 1,795 bills dealing with licensing tasks—or, as it is often 
called, scope of practice bills—were proposed during the two-year 
period from January 2011 to December 2012, and about 20 percent of 
these bills were adopted. 
Studies of occupational licensing have shown the infl uence of 
licensing when regulations are introduced or become more strin-
gent (Cathles, Harrington, and Krynski 2010; Cox and Foster 1990; 
Kleiner and Todd 2009). A key question relates to the issue of the 
infl uence of occupational regulations on wages, employment, and 
prices when regulations are changed in ways that alter the boundaries 
and shared work space between two occupations. For example, what 
are the effects of regulations that affect the scope of practice afforded 
to nurse practitioners? 
 Nurse practitioners are registered nurses who have obtained addi-
tional training through a master’s or PhD degree program (Dueker et 
al. 2005; Harper and Johnson 1998). They are trained to diagnose 
and treat common illnesses and injuries, manage chronic illnesses, 
prescribe medications, and provide counseling. Nurse practitioners 
face a variety of state-specifi c occupational regulations that restrict 
their activities and their relationship with physicians. Three important 
regulations for nurse practitioners are those that involve limitations 
on prescription authority, the ability to practice independently, and 
the ability to be reimbursed by insurers for their services. 
Policy Assessments of Nurse Practitioner Regulations
Based on the large number of states that are considering chang-
ing their statutes on occupational regulations (as noted earlier), there 
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is evidence that state governments continue to be interested in alter-
ing their scope of practice regulations. For example, nurse practition-
ers who live on the border of Illinois and Missouri fi nd that they are 
allowed to perform more tasks in Illinois than Missouri. One illustra-
tion is provided in the following comments: “As an advanced nurse 
practitioner with offi ces in Illinois and Missouri, I have a unique per-
spective. . . . Treatment for bronchitis can include cough syrup with 
codeine, and back pain may require a pain medication. In Illinois, 
after examination and diagnosis, I can write prescriptions (for drugs 
such as cough syrup with codeine). In Missouri, I need to delay the 
patient and interrupt the physician to have him prescribe the medica-
tions. This creates unnecessary delays and may require extra trips for 
the patient” (McQuaide 2007, p. C3). 
Physicians have generally opposed broadening the scope of tasks 
that nurse practitioners are allowed to perform. For example, the Mis-
souri State Medical Association was largely opposed to providing 
nurse practitioners with the ability to prescribe controlled substances. 
It supported alternatives in which nurse practitioners had only par-
tial or short-term prescription rights: “The medical association wants 
limits on how much nurse practitioners could prescribe, capping the 
amount of medicine to enough for three to fi ve days, for example, just 
to fi ll an immediate need before the patient could see a physician” 
(Lieb 2008 [online]).
These cases seem to represent the kinds of arguments made 
by nurse practitioners and physician organizations that lobby state 
governments. For economists or policy analysts, one concern is that 
these statements do not offer much information about the under-
lying market or social problems that scope of practice regulations is 
intended to address. Moreover, discussions about scope of practice 
regulations pay little attention to the possibility of unintended con-
sequences. For instance, the public health implications seem to be an 
important missing piece of the discussion of prescription authority 
in Missouri. Under the “small doses framework” described by the 
Missouri State Medical Association, for example, it is possible that 
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patients who visit a nurse practitioner for convenience reasons may 
forgo a second follow-up visit to a physician. In that case, the small 
dose restrictions could increase the chances that patients complete 
a partial dose of antibiotics, which could generate more antibiotic-
resistant infections in the future. Besides the public health concern, 
the two-visit approach might substantially diminish any effi ciency 
gains from granting more authority to nurse practitioners. 
Physician advocacy groups often lobby state politicians to pre-
serve laws requiring physician supervision for nurse practitioners. 
For example, in a recent review in the popular press, Elizabeth Dears, 
a senior vice president for the Medical Society of the state of New 
York, said in testimony to lawmakers that removing doctor over-
sight of nurse practitioners “would seriously endanger the patients 
for whom they care” (Pettypiece 2013, pp. 27–28). This perspective 
lends some support to the view that quality and safety concerns are 
the main justifi cation for scope of practice laws considered at the state 
level. However, evidence that physician supervision of nurse practi-
tioners improves patient safety is rarely offered.
What can we learn from these case studies? One issue is that phy-
sician lobby groups think that at least some consumers would like to 
substitute nurse practitioner visits for physician visits, and that con-
cerns about service quality and patient safety are common arguments 
used to oppose expanded authority for nurse practitioners. In addi-
tion, relaxed state licensing provisions resulted in an increase in the 
wages of nurse practitioners and a reduction in the earnings of physi-
cians, but they had no infl uence on deaths or malpractice premiums. 
LICENSED AND CERTIFIED OCCUPATIONS 
IN CONSTRUCTION—ARCHITECTS VERSUS 
INTERIOR DESIGNERS  
Occupations that are only certifi ed and include tasks that over-
lap with those of licensed professionals are at a disadvantage in the 
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labor market because the state statutes and administrative procedures 
declare what work must be completed only by licensed workers and 
not by certifi ed ones; it is common for these statutes to dispropor-
tionately favor licensed professionals over certifi ed ones. A specifi c 
job task in the construction industry that overlaps the work of inte-
rior designers and architects is developing blueprints of the interior 
design of commercial structures and verifying that these blueprints 
meet all state and local requirements. This approval process is called 
“signing and sealing the blueprints.” Initially, only architects or inte-
rior designers working under the direct supervision of architects were 
allowed to provide this service. By 2012 all states allowed architects 
to implement sign and seal, but only 11 states allowed designers to do 
the task. Who is allowed to sign and seal, or offer fi nal approval of 
blueprints, is a major issue for both interior designers and architects 
because it is lucrative and provides control over the fi nal plans for the 
blueprints for building interiors of new construction. 
For example, Georgia recently partially deregulated architectural 
services to allow interior designers to sign and seal. The bill amend-
ing the Georgia law that allows registered interior designers to draft, 
sign, and seal their own technical drawings for state approval was 
introduced in the legislature in 2009. Ryan Day, the associate direc-
tor of Government and Public Affairs at ASID, when describing the 
need for this regulation, stated that “previous requirements called for 
architectural or structural review even though there were no struc-
tural alterations in the design plans. These requirements signifi cantly 
infl ated project costs and increased costs for consumers” (ASID 
2005). The bill to amend the statute was met with opposition from 
the Georgia chapter of the American Institute of Architects (Georgia 
AIA), which prepared a 17-page document, “Vote No on SB 28 and 
HB 231,” that outlined problems with the proposed bill. The issues 
are summarized in the following 2009 statement by Georgia AIA 
president Michael Lowry: “It is important that we contact our state 
legislators today and tell them that we do not support this bill because 
it represents an expansion into areas of ‘Life Safety,’ where interior 
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designers do not have adequate training” (Lowry 2009 [online]). The 
“Vote No” document, however, did not provide any evidence that 
interior designers could not competently develop, sign, and seal the 
interior blueprints for commercial structures. Further, Georgia AIA 
president Lowry called for architects to “draft a letter to [their] sena-
tor urging them to oppose this bill” (Lowry and Perpall 2009). How-
ever, the Georgia AIA efforts were unsuccessful, and the bill became 
law in June 2010. 
The consumers of architectural services and interior designers 
may be the immediate benefi ciaries of the deregulation of archi-
tects. Following deregulation, consumers may be able to purchase 
the services of similar or perhaps even better quality from interior 
designers at a lower price.1 The Georgia law now permits designers to 
work without architects’ supervision, which may positively infl uence 
designers’ incomes and employment. In contrast, the Georgia statute 
may have the opposite infl uence on architects’ incomes and employ-
ment. Therefore, Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2012) focus on the effects 
of the introduction of sign and seal regulations and other such state 
statutes covering these two occupations on practitioners’ wages and 
employment. 
According to ASID (2010), the goal of interior designers today 
is to become regulated and eventually licensed by government. The 
rationale is that interior designers must become licensed in order to 
maintain legitimacy in their occupation relative to their complements 
and competitors in construction design, such as architects and engi-
neers, in order to maintain their job tasks and income. 
In the related engineering occupation, government regulation 
had evolved by the 1960s to include civil, electrical, mechanical, and 
industrial engineers. Since at that time only engineers could sign off 
on initial and fi nal construction design and implementation of fi nal 
construction, interior designers assumed an inferior position among 
occupations offering construction services. Moreover, architects were 
solely responsible for developing the initial structural design, which 
further diminished the role of interior designers. Over time, state and 
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local governments have generally gained a more important role in 
determining the work process requirements in the construction indus-
try. Government statutes or administrative procedures have gradually 
become the sole determinants of the appropriate types of labor inputs 
in construction. Within this institutional environment, interior design-
ers fi gure that the only way for them to access certain types of work 
in such a growing fi eld is to also become a licensed occupation; there-
fore, they have lobbied for licensing in a number of states and sought 
legal status for drafting construction blueprints. 
Recent estimates from Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2012) suggest 
that giving interior designers the ability to provide the sign and seal 
service increases their earnings, and higher earnings are associated 
with more individuals entering the occupation. There are no such 
effects on the earnings or employment of architects. These fi ndings 
suggest that architects and interior designers are more likely to be 
complements than substitutes in the production of sign and seal ser-
vices. Architects could inappropriately allocate their resources when 
they try to interfere with the passing of sign and seal legislation.
LICENSED OCCUPATIONS THAT DO SIMILAR 
TASKS—PHYSICAL THERAPISTS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPISTS
The previous examples of occupations that are battling for man-
dates to do work legally show where architects have the upper hand 
in one of two ways: by being licensed for a much longer time or 
by being a licensed occupation dealing with one that was certifi ed; 
namely, interior designers. In this case I examine the effects of occu-
pational regulations on the practice restrictions faced by two overlap-
ping occupations: physical therapists (PTs) and occupational thera-
pists (OTs). These occupations are female dominated, they require 
graduate degrees to practice, and they have some overlap covering 
the same tasks. Across different situations, the services of a PT may 
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function as either a substitute or a complement for the services of 
other medical professionals such as an OT. It is possible, for example, 
that PTs provide a set of services that are very similar to those offered 
by OTs but that are offered with a greater emphasis on factors such as 
convenience, personal attention, or specialization that are important 
to some patients in some situations. In short, PTs are an ideal example 
of an occupation with training and productive capacities that in some 
cases overlap with other occupations like OTs. This overlap means 
that the content and context of the work provided by PTs depend on a 
variety of occupational regulations that have varied across states and 
over time. 
I look at these two occupations in order to understand in a more 
detailed way how occupational regulations affect labor market out-
comes in the United States. Unlike other examinations of occupa-
tions that focus on ones that were dominant and subordinate, OTs and 
PTs are equivalent in terms of their incomes, prices charged, educa-
tion, and tasks (Kleiner and Park 2010; Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012; 
Kleiner et al. 2014). This examination shows how two occupations 
that have some overlap where regulations could matter for their labor 
market outcomes.
There is a large amount of empirical literature devoted to estimat-
ing the wage and employment effects of licensing regulations, and it 
includes work related to a variety of health occupations.2 The litera-
ture concerned with overlapping occupations where substitution and 
complements may be important is much smaller and more recent. OTs 
and PTs are plausibly complementary because patients who visit an 
OT for basic health services also may be referred to a PT for more 
complex care. More generally, using an OT for low-complexity home 
care may free up time for PTs to specialize in more complex care—for 
example, muscular/skeletal development, which is essential to mobil-
ity and could be more lucrative. Some of these regulatory preferences 
may depend on the industrial organization of the medical sector. One 
conjecture is that health workers whose compensation depends in part 
on the economic performance of a particular health care fi rm might be 
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less supportive of regulations that force the fi rm to adopt production 
processes that are not effi cient. 
There is some empirical work on the regulation of other over-
lapping occupations. Kleiner and Park (2010) provide evidence that 
occupational regulations may alter the boundaries between the work 
tasks of dentists and dental hygienists, and may affect the earnings 
of both occupational groups. For example, Marier and Wing (2014) 
study regulations that defi ne whether a hygienist may independently 
perform particular dental procedures: allowing hygienists to perform 
the service leads to lower prices for that service. Stange (2011) fi nds 
that increases in the supply of nurse practitioners and physician assis-
tants at the county level do not directly increase utilization of health 
services, but they do lead to small gains in utilization in geographical 
areas that offer more independence to them, as measured by an index 
of regulations and by prescription drug authority. The examination 
of outcomes in labor markets that are closely connected to scope of 
practice regulations being studied allows us to trace the effects of the 
regulations across different occupations, such as PTs and OTs. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
The impact of different state licensure laws for the two pro-
fessions in terms of the need for physician referral would cer-
tainly have workforce implications, whether this supports col-
laboration or points to growing differences between the two 
professions is still to be determined. In addition to concerns 
over the efforts to achieve unrestricted access directed by physi-
cal therapists, some occupational therapists are protesting what 
they believe to be added language in physical therapy practice 
acts in the area of “functional training in self-care and in home, 
community or work reintegration.” Although this terminology 
has been in physical therapist education program accreditation 
criteria and practice acts for many years, the American Occu-
pational Therapy Association has taken the position that this 
terminology is evidence of PTs encroachment into the scope of 
practice of OT. (Fisher and Keehn 2007, p. 26)
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There is a distinctive difference in the general work of OTs and 
PTs. Occupational therapists train or retrain individuals to do general 
work that allows patients to work independently, whereas physical 
therapy focuses on physical rehabilitation and muscular and skeletal 
improvements. However, there are several areas where the two occu-
pations overlap. These are areas of modality or method of treatment, 
wound care, and orthopedics and foot care. A key issue for both occu-
pations is to get insurers to pay for direct access rather than being 
billed through a medical facility or a physician’s offi ce. Another key 
element for both occupations is how they bill through Medicare and 
how they are reimbursed for care.
Occupational Therapists
Occupational therapists defi ne their work as follows:
The therapeutic use of everyday life activities (occupations) 
with individuals or groups for the purpose of participation in 
roles and situations in home, school, workplace, community, 
and other settings. Occupational therapy services are provided 
for the purpose of promoting health and wellness and to those 
who have or are at risk for developing an illness, injury, disease, 
disorder, condition, impairment, disability, activity limitation, 
or participation restriction. Occupational therapy addresses the 
physical, cognitive, psychosocial, sensory, and other aspects of 
performance in a variety of contexts to support engagement in 
everyday life activities that affect health, well-being, and quality 
of life. (American Occupational Therapy Association 2014, p. 2)
According to the BLS (2014), the entry level requirement is a 
masters’ degree. However, many in the occupation, including those at 
the occupational association, see the entry qualifi cations as a doctoral 
degree. 
In contrast, PT tasks are noted as follows: “Physical therapists 
help people who have injuries or illnesses improve their movement 
and manage their pain. They are often an important part of rehabili-
tation and treatment of patients with chronic conditions or injuries” 
(BLS 2014). 
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The current entry point into the occupation as of 2016 is a doc-
toral degree, which is a professional degree that requires three years 
of classroom work and internships beyond a bachelor’s degree. This 
is the requirement established by the major accrediting body for the 
occupation and is the default of most state licensing boards. Key ele-
ments for both these occupations are direct access to the patient and 
the billing of procedures for Medicare and health insurance.
Regulating Physical Therapists and Occupational Therapists
Physical therapy as an occupation gained much greater public 
attention as a medical intervention and use following World Wars I 
and II. During and following these confl icts, wounded soldiers used 
a combination of surgery and noninvasive procedures such as physi-
cal therapy. The number of PTs grew, and their procedures generally 
involved similar processes and standard patient care. The physical 
therapists then formed organizations that were the initial movers to 
obtain occupational licensing across states. Pennsylvania was the fi rst 
state to license PTs in 1913, followed by New York in 1926. In 2003, 
Kansas became the last state to license the occupation. 
In a similar manner, OTs were regulated much later than PTs. 
Florida was the fi rst state to license OTs in 1975. In 2013, Colorado 
licensed occupational therapists, but Hawaii did not pass a law fully 
licensing occupational therapists until 2014. Occupational therapists 
were licensed decades after PTs, and only recently have most of the 
states chosen to fully regulate. 
Empirical estimates show that occupational licensing raises the 
wages of both practitioners, and that the duration—how long the 
occupation has been licensed in the state—is the dominant infl uence 
on wage determination. Occupational licensing also is associated 
with a reduction in hours worked. The ability of PTs to have direct 
access to patients is associated with a reduction in hourly earnings 
for OTs, suggesting some substitution for certain services across the 
two occupations. The fi ndings show that the introduction of a licens-
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ing statute reduces the relative number of both OTs and PTs. There is 
also a negative infl uence on hours worked as a consequence of licens-
ing statutes. Also, for physical therapists, the duration of licensing is 
associated with a reduction in the relative number of practitioners. 
The ability of these two occupations to be both complements and 
substitutes for one another provides new evidence on how regulated 
occupations infl uence one another. 
CONCLUSIONS
With the growth in the number of licensed occupations, it is not 
surprising that the tasks of regulated occupations may overlap. Since 
the tasks that are legal are determined by the legislature, governor, or 
administrative boards, political pressure may determine which occu-
pations are allocated tasks. This is an especially important issue in 
health care, where dentists and dental hygienists may contest which 
tasks are appropriate for each occupation. Similarly, doctors and nurse 
practitioners may contest which occupation can perform routine and 
sophisticated tasks. In some occupations, where the occupations have 
similar levels of skill and training, such as PTs and OTs, the allocation 
of work is determined by the boards and the legislature. Even out-
side health care, occupations such as architects and interior designers 
battle for the right to provide sign and seal provisions for the designs 
of the interiors of buildings. For the occupations that are battling to 
provide services, the legislature and regulatory boards substitute their 
views of the appropriate occupation to provide the service rather than 
consumers. 
Kleiner 2015.indb   58 11/23/2015   1:34:29 PM
Battles among Licensed Occupations   59
Notes
 1.  The statement about the potential quality effects is based on the fact 
that only interior designers who acquire suffi cient education and work 
experience and pass tests are allowed to develop and sign and seal their 
blueprints of interior design. Furthermore, although 11 states allow inte-
rior designers to sign and seal, and Louisiana introduced this regulation 
in 1985, we did not fi nd any complaints fi led against interior designers 
by customers who were unsatisfi ed with the service. 
 2.  See Kleiner (2006) for a review of the empirical literature on wage- 
determination effects of licensing.
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Chapter 5
Occupational Licensing in 
Different Institutional and 
International Contexts
Millions of Europeans, from bartenders to soccer stars, have 
to deal with what might be called the certifi cation complex—a 
requirement that they be certifi ed to pursue their jobs in a time-
consuming process dating back to 19th-century apprentice-
ships. Economists say it is a big reason behind Europe’s high 
unemployment and lagging productivity.
—John Miller, Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2004 
As this newspaper article suggests, the regulation of occupations 
is perceived to be a major factor in the lack of effi ciency in the labor 
market and a contributor to lagging productivity and unemployment 
in Europe. Is this the case, and do the European methods of regulat-
ing occupations have different labor market outcomes from those in 
the United States? Does occupational licensing infl uence the labor 
market the same way in the United States relative to other nations 
with different institutional and cultural settings? Are the wage effects 
of occupational licensing similar to that found in the United States? 
Would the same theories that apply to the U.S. legal and cultural set-
ting also infl uence Europe and China? This chapter will attempt to 
answer how occupational licensing works in these settings. More spe-
cifi cally, the chapter focuses on many interesting legal conditions of 
occupational licensing in the European Union (EU), with illustrations 
and applications to the United Kingdom (UK) and China. 
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OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Observing licensing in Europe provides a comparison of this 
institution relative to its consequences in the United States. The focus 
of U.S. licensing is on control of entry and mobility across states, 
with little attention to the prices charged, method of payment, or bar-
riers to advertising. In contrast, entry in the EU is somewhat easier 
and usually shorter for entry into the professions. For most occupa-
tions, joining occurs immediately after high school, though this pro-
cess is highly competitive. Students matriculate into the professions 
and usually fi nish their professional education, which is subsidized 
in large part by the government, at an earlier age than in the United 
States. Following entry, there tend to be many more constraints on 
work, which include the location, prices charged, and the lack of an 
opportunity to provide information to consumers on the quality of the 
service through advertising. In the licensed health professions, the 
employer is often the government or is heavily subsidized by national 
funds. Unfortunately, there have been no analytical examinations of 
the impact that licensing in these nations has on the quality of ser-
vice received in the EU. This stands in contrast to the relatively large 
number of studies that have examined licensing in the United States. 
For the most part, the empirical work shows that licensing has mod-
est to no impact on quality relative to a regime of certifi cation or 
registration.
 If national inequality is low and constraints on the occupation 
are high, then price and wage impacts are likely to be modest. On the 
other hand, the impact of this regulatory policy where there are few 
fi nancial incentives to succeed may lead to less effort because wage 
variations are small, or because the more able seek occupations where 
the fi nancial constraints are less limited. In addition, innovation, cre-
ativity, and employment may be reduced in the regulated sector as 
relative fi nancial incentives in the regulated sector are small, but entry 
requirements are tough.
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For a number of occupations in Europe, prospective professionals 
must satisfy the requirements set by national governments and profes-
sional associations. This usually means passing a licensing exam and 
possibly meeting educational, residency, moral character, and fi tness 
requirements. For example, physicians, nurses, and teachers are com-
monly required to be licensed to practice their professions throughout 
the EU. Perhaps less well known is that hundreds of other occupations 
are also subject to licensing regulations. Real estate and travel agents, 
manicurists, podiatrists, golf instructors, beekeepers, stonemasons, 
car mechanics, musical instrument manufacturers, corset makers, and 
potters are just some of the more than 800 professions that, according 
to the European Commission, are affected by occupational regulation 
in at least one European country (Koumenta et al. 2014). 
No comprehensive information exists as to how many European 
workers are subject to occupational regulation. As was mentioned ear-
lier in this book, occupational licensing in the United States directly 
affects about 29 percent of workers (Kleiner and Krueger 2013), 
which is substantially more than those affected by other labor market 
institutions, such as the minimum wage or unionization. Similarly, 
it is unknown whether the number of European workers affected by 
licensing is increasing or decreasing. However, for the United States, 
we know that this number has been systematically growing for the 
past 60 years. Thus, the fi rst objective of this section is to show the 
prevalence of occupational regulation in the EU and provide a broad 
description of occupational regulation. 
Table 5.1 shows the number of occupations that are licensed in 
each EU nation in 2012. The EU Single Market Regulated Professions 
Database (maintained by the EU Commission) includes information 
on whether various occupations are licensed in each country.1 Draw-
ing on this source, we know, for example, that lawyers, physicians, 
and nurses are licensed professions in all countries (i.e., there are 
some tasks that are reserved for these professions in each country). 
Architects and mechanical engineers also are often licensed, while 
real estate agents, fi nancial brokers, and ski instructors are licensed 
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Table 5.1  Licensed Occupations in the EU-27, 2012 
Number of licensed professions
Estonia 14
Latvia 16
Lithuania 27
Sweden 38
Bulgaria 39
Luxembourg 48
Romania 48
Ireland 57
Cyprus 62
Finland 63
Hungary 75
Malta 75
Belgium 78
Portugal 85
Germany 86
Italy 86
Netherlands 87
Denmark 90
France 90
Greece 98
Slovak Republic 109
Spain 112
United Kingdom 131
Slovenia 135
Austria 151
Poland 162
Czech Republic 215
Total EU 2,277
SOURCE: The EU Single Market Regulated Professions Database (accessed in spring 
2012) from Koumenta et al. (2014).
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only in some countries. Unfortunately, there is no systematic source 
of data on professions subject to registration, certifi cation, or accredi-
tation. Consequently, the focus in the chapter is on licensing. 
The data were collected to match information on licensed pro-
fessions with labor force survey micro data sets from the European 
Labour Force Survey, a large household sample survey providing 
data on labor participation of employees and self-employed aged 15 
and over, living in private households.2 This method of data collec-
tion means we are collecting data on the coverage of workers rather 
than those who have attained a license. National statistical institutes 
in each member state are responsible for selecting the sample, pre-
paring the questionnaires, conducting the direct interviews among 
households, and forwarding the results to Eurostat in accordance with 
the common coding scheme.3 In our subsequent analysis, we pool the 
observations from the four successive quarters in 2012 to produce an 
annual data set.4
As Koumenta et al. (2014) point out, there are more than 800 occu-
pations licensed in at least one country and over 2,700 occupation-
country combinations. The Baltic states, Sweden, and Bulgaria 
have fewer than 40 licensed occupations, while the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Austria, and Slovenia have more than 130. Differences 
among countries are very large and refl ect the diverse types of activi-
ties subject to licensing in different countries. They do not refl ect the 
prevalence of licensing in the workforce, as the number of practitio-
ners within different occupations may vary.
Because it is diffi cult to determine the exact proportion of workers 
affected by regulation in the mixed group (where some are licensed 
and others are not), it is diffi cult to estimate the proportion of workers 
subject to licensing. However, it is possible to estimate the maximum 
and the minimum number of workers subject to regulation.5 Table 5.1 
reports the number of licensed occupations by country based on these 
occupation codes. 
Table 5.2 gives the estimated number of employed individuals 
in each of the 27 countries in the EU in 2012 that are infl uenced by 
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Table 5.2  Prevalence of Occupational Regulation in EU-27 
Countries, 2012
Prevalence of occupational regulation
Country Upper bound Lower bound Upper-lower
Estonia 0.03 0.03 0.00
Latviaa 0.06 0.03 0.03
Lithuania 0.07 0.06 0.01
Ireland 0.11 0.08 0.02
Romania 0.11 0.10 0.01
Malta 0.14 0.11 0.03
Sweden 0.14 0.11 0.04
Bulgariaa 0.15 0.04 0.11
Finland 0.15 0.10 0.05
Netherlands 0.16 0.10 0.06
Luxembourg 0.20 0.11 0.09
France 0.20 0.13 0.07
United Kingdom 0.21 0.11 0.10
Portugala 0.21 0.07 0.14
Slovenia 0.22 0.11 0.11
Slovak Republic 0.23 0.12 0.10
Hungary 0.23 0.14 0.09
Spaina 0.26 0.08 0.17
Belgium 0.26 0.16 0.10
Greecea 0.26 0.08 0.18
Poland 0.27 0.14 0.12
Italya 0.27 0.06 0.21
Austria 0.29 0.15 0.14
Cyprusa 0.30 0.09 0.21
Germanya 0.31 0.04 0.27
Czech Republic 0.39 0.17 0.22
Denmarka 0.43 0.13 0.30
Total EU 0.24 0.09 0.15
NOTE: Estimates are based on EULFS data for 2012. 
aCountries for which only three-digit International Standard Classifi cation of Occupa-
tions codes are available in the EULFS survey.
SOURCE: Koumenta et al. (2014).
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occupational regulation relative to their unregulated counterparts. 
The results show considerable variation across countries that largely 
refl ect the different data used to compile the estimates. The results 
from the table show that between 9 and 24 percent of European work-
ers are subject to occupational licensing, which is between 19 and 51 
million individuals. These are among the fi rst estimates of the preva-
lence of occupational regulation coverage in the European Union to 
be produced. The percent licensed even at the higher bound is lower 
than the U.S. estimates in the high 20-plus percent range. 
The countries in Table 5.2 are sorted from the lowest to the high-
est percentage of workers that are licensed. The Baltic states, Ireland, 
Romania, Malta, Sweden, Bulgaria, and Finland all have less than 
15 percent of the labor force infl uenced by occupational licensing 
(Koumenta et al. 2014). This group also includes the Netherlands 
and France. The 9 countries with the highest prevalence of regulation 
include nations such as Spain, Italy, and Germany. 
Having many occupations that are licensed does not mean that 
the percent of the workforce that is licensed is high. These results 
are not always in line with those obtained at the occupation level in 
Table 5.1. For example, there is a commonly held view that certain 
countries, such as Greece, Italy, and Cyprus, are overregulating their 
occupations, but these assertions are linked more to the number of 
individuals working within licensed occupations rather than to the 
actual proportion of occupations licensed. On the other hand, while 
Denmark licenses only 90 occupations (and is thus in the intermediate 
category in Table 5.1), such arrangements could cover a signifi cant 
proportion of its workforce. Similarly, Cyprus licenses only 62 occu-
pations, but up to 30 percent of the workforce is affected by these 
regulations.6 Through the work by Mario Pagliero and others in the 
European Union and Britain to document the level of occupational 
licensing by nation in Europe, the data documented in these tables are 
informative; however, trends still have not been able to be developed 
on the direction of occupational regulation in the European Union 
(Koumenta et al. 2014). 
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 As shown in Chapter 1, Poland is in the process of deregulat-
ing many of its national occupational labor markets (Kleiner and 
Lachowska 2014). The Poland Prime Minister’s offi ce (Prime Min-
ister’s Offi ce [Poland] 2012) has stated that liberalizing access is 
expected to have the following three consequences:
 1)  Removing the barriers to enter regulated professions will 
result in higher employment. In fact, the prime minister’s 
offi ce has stated, “According to expert estimates, deregu-
lation may increase employment within the [occupations] 
concerned by 15–20 percent” (Poland Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce 2012).
 2)  There will be lower prices and better quality services in the 
sectors that deregulate access to professions.
 3)  Administrative costs will be lower than the costs of main-
taining the current regulatory system. 
ANOTHER EXAMPLE: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Although this chapter presents basic data on occupational regula-
tion in the EU, it is particularly informative to examine a country that, 
in contrast to most of the other EU nations, has documented more 
thoroughly the growth of occupational regulation in recent years. The 
United Kingdom, given that the size and the relative openness of its 
labor market are closer in institutional structure to the United States 
than most of the other nations in the EU, is particularly interesting. 
In addition there has been more analysis of occupational licensing in 
the UK. 
By comparison, the UK regulates more occupations than Ger-
many and the Mediterranean economies, such as Italy, Greece, and 
Portugal. Somewhat surprisingly, with 131 regulated occupations, the 
UK has one of the highest proportions of regulated occupations in 
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the EU. Differences among countries are very large and refl ect the 
diverse types of activities subject to licensing in different countries. 
They do not refl ect the prevalence of licensing in the workforce, as 
the number of practitioners within different occupations may vary. 
The prevalence of licensing in the UK is between 11 and 21 percent, 
which places it in the group of countries with intermediate regulation 
(16–26 percent).7
As a basis of comparison, two decades after the closed shop was 
outlawed in Britain, entry into a sizable and growing proportion of 
all jobs in Britain has been restricted through occupational licens-
ing by government (Bryson et al. 2012; Metcalf and Stewart 1992). 
In a closed shop, union membership is a precondition for doing a 
job. A precondition under occupational licensing is possession of a 
government-issued license to practice in order to work. Similar to 
the United States, working for pay within the occupation in the UK 
without a government license is an offense punishable by fi nes and/or 
incarceration under the appropriate licensing statutes. 
Recent attempts to estimate the wage effect of licensing in the 
UK follow the same approach as that in the United States. Drawing 
on the 2008 Labour Force Survey, a large survey of UK employees, 
Humphris, Kleiner, and Koumenta (2011) show that licensing is asso-
ciated with a 13 percent wage premium once human capital and labor 
market characteristics are controlled for. The study provides one of 
the fi rst overall wage impacts of licensing in the UK, and the esti-
mates are quite similar to the infl uence of the closed shop on wage 
determination (Metcalf and Stewart 1992). Also, the impact of licens-
ing on wages in the UK is similar to that in the United States. 
Occupational licensing in the UK has been growing in a manner 
similar to the United States. By 2010, 14 percent of all jobs under-
taken by UK employees were subject to licensing by the government, 
a growth of over two percentage points in just a decade, but still well 
below the U.S. estimates. Also like the United States, the wage pre-
mium in the UK is positively related to the stringency of the occupa-
tional licensing requirements. In addition, for the UK, the premium 
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increases with the length of time since occupational licensing was 
fi rst implemented. However, wage increases have not occurred for 
occupations that have become licensed within the last decade (Bryson 
et al. 2012). One reason for this fi nding may be that individuals are 
grandfathered in, and it takes them time to leave or retire from the 
occupation. Furthermore, it takes time for the licensing board to 
implement requirements (such as tests and continuing education) that 
may reduce the number of individuals that enter or stay in the occupa-
tion. A similar rationale has been applied to the gradual emergence 
of a union wage premium following plant-level unionization in the 
United States (Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Lee and Mas 2012).
INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The UK approach to occupational regulation has many similari-
ties with those found in other Commonwealth countries, such as Aus-
tralia and Canada, but has some marked differences with the U.S. 
approach. It involves a variety of diverse institutional structures, 
including general and industry-specifi c law, as well as practices based 
on custom. For example, it can be statutory, meaning that the require-
ment for a license is set down in statute, or it can be voluntary. In the 
former case, it largely follows the approach so that professions are 
granted status by an Act of Parliament, indicating that regulation is 
at the national level. Also, the approach can vary depending on the 
range of products or services that are licensed—an individual with a 
specifi c job title can provide all products and services covered by that 
occupation (known as protection of title), or a specifi c job title can 
enable the individual to undertake certain activities or provide only 
specifi c services (known as protection of function). 
This latter form of regulation does not restrict individuals from 
entering the profession, but it places restrictions on the activities they 
are allowed to perform as part of the profession. For example, an elec-
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trician can carry out electrical installations, but a licensed electrician 
has to inspect these installations and certify their safety. Also, regula-
tion can vary depending on whether the license is issued by an occu-
pational body or a government organization, or whether the license is 
issued on a local basis, usually by a local authority. Although there is 
national licensing, in certain cases local areas can have authority over 
the issuance of the license. Regulatory bodies in the UK are indepen-
dent of any branch of government, but they work closely with gov-
ernment departments when reviewing occupational regulation issues. 
The majority of occupations in the UK are licensed nationally; 
taxi drivers, who are issued a license at a local authority level, are 
an exception. Requirements for obtaining a license or becoming 
registered with a professional body can include passing an industry-
specifi c exam, demonstrating work practices, and passing a medical 
or criminal record check. Finally, a license in the UK can either be 
permanent or have to be renewed periodically to demonstrate contin-
ued fi tness to practice. 
Based on these dimensions, occupational regulation in the UK can 
take the following forms: certifi cation or registration. Certifi cation, or 
accreditation, is the process in which a relevant authority assesses 
whether practitioners meet a minimum set of predetermined criteria 
that demonstrate competence and knowledge in a specifi c area. A pri-
vate nonprofi t industry body is usually responsible for overseeing the 
process and granting the certifi cate. As in the United States, certifi ca-
tion is not mandatory; therefore, a noncertifi ed practitioner also may 
provide similar services. However, given that certifi cation indicates 
the achievement of a certain level of skill, consumers may be pre-
pared to pay a premium for using a certifi ed practitioner as opposed 
to a noncertifi ed one. 
Registration, on the other hand, may be voluntary or manda-
tory—the law requires practitioners to be registered (e.g., doctors), 
and it involves practitioners to meet certain standards before they can 
enter the register of qualifi ed practitioners in the fi eld. Requirements 
for registration may include attaining certain educational qualifi ca-
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tions and passing exams. Registration with the relevant body may 
involve a statutory protection of a title, in that only those who are 
members of such a body may call themselves by that title (known 
as protection of title). For example, it is not a requirement to hold a 
license to describe oneself or to practice as a surveyor, but to use the 
title Chartered Surveyor, one must be a member of the Royal Institute 
of Chartered Surveyors. Using a protected title without being reg-
istered with the relevant regulatory body is an offense that carries 
a fi nancial penalty. This has many similarities to certifi cation in the 
United States.
NONTRADITIONAL LICENSING: CHINA
Similar to the UK and most of the EU, China has licensing that 
is primarily at the national level. Workers’ efforts to become certifi ed 
or licensed throughout China have greatly increased in recent years. 
Employees and college students have put considerable effort toward 
obtaining occupational certifi cates and licenses. For example, in 2003, 
0.9 million people applied for the certifi ed public accountant (CPA) 
licensing examination in China. In 2007 and 2010, this increased to 
1.06 million and 1.3 million, respectively (China Statistical Yearbook 
2003–2010). By 2012 the value had increased to 1.8 million who took 
the CPA licensing examination in China; this represents a 13.6 per-
cent increase in the number of examinees from 2011.8 The Ministry 
of Human Resource and Social Security (MHRSS) agency estimates 
that in 2007 alone about 10 million people obtained at least one occu-
pational certifi cate. 
Occupational certifi cates are becoming increasingly important in 
employment, wage, and promotion decisions. A survey of job seekers 
in China suggests that 52 percent of the respondents think that under 
the same conditions, job candidates with more certifi cates have an 
advantage in the labor market.9 Some fi rms also reward employees for 
obtaining additional occupational certifi cates; given the same job, an 
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employee’s base salary will increase by $80–$160 per month for cer-
tain types of certifi cates.10 However, despite the general growth in the 
number of certifi cates and the widespread opinion that occupational 
certifi cates can bring advantages with respect to employment and 
pay, there is evidence to indicate that certifi cation can enhance wage 
determination in China (Chi, Kleiner, and Qian, forthcoming). The 
national occupational regulation system in China is different from the 
primarily state-by-state regulation in the United States. 
As mentioned, occupational regulation in the United States takes 
three forms: registration, certifi cation, and licensing. Registration is 
the least restrictive form of regulation and licensing the most restric-
tive, since monetary and incarceration penalties can be incurred for 
providing the service for pay without governmental approval (Kleiner 
2000, 2006; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Similarly, China has occupa-
tional certifi cation and licensing regulations. As in the United States, 
certifi cation in China is less restrictive than licensing. Certifi cation 
permits any person to perform the relevant job, but the government 
administers an examination and certifi es those who have achieved the 
level of skill for certifi cation. Hiring uncertifi ed individuals, however, 
carries no legal consequences. The certifi cation system in China can 
be traced back to the 1950s. After economic reform, occupational 
certifi cation became more widespread in the labor market and was 
increasingly accepted by both employees and employers as a creden-
tialing mechanism.
In China, licensing is more restrictive than certifi cation; under 
the licensing regulation, working in an occupation without a license 
is illegal. Penalties for practicing without a license include fi nes and 
imprisonment. For example, according to the Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, Article 336, people practicing medicine 
without a license are deemed as “unlawfully practicing.” They may 
be sentenced to 1–3 years’ imprisonment, may be fi ned, or may be 
both imprisoned and fi ned. If such a practice causes severe harm to 
patients, punishment could increase to imprisonment of 3–10 years. 
Licensing requirements include educational or training prerequisites, 
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examinations, internship, and residency in the profession. As an 
important labor market institution, the occupational licensing system 
in China was introduced after economic reform started in 1979. 
China’s legislative system is known as a uniform legal hierarchy 
with multiple levels. Within the hierarchy, the order of the effect of 
laws begins with the constitution, down to national laws passed by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, adminis-
trative regulations, decisions, and decrees (promulgated by the State 
Council and ministries and commissions of the State Council), and 
fi nally, local regulations (Paler 2005). Local authorities (provinces) 
have limited legislative power. Relevant to occupation licensing, the 
regulations were formulated and promulgated by the state council and 
its ministries and departments. Thus, there is no variation across prov-
inces in licensing regulations. The uniformity of licensing regulations 
across China is an important distinction from the United States, where 
there is substantial variation across and even within states. Unlike 
licensing rules, for some professions, certifi cation rules were made by 
provincial authorities, often in conjunction with professional associa-
tions, where there is an opportunity for the associations to limit entry 
or raise requirements for maintaining a license. 
Among the many types of occupational certifi cates, the major-
ity are those issued by the MHRSS. As of 2012, 1,055 jobs out of 
the total of 1,838 jobs catalogued in China’s Occupation Classifi ca-
tion System are covered by the MHRSS certifi cation system.11 These 
1,055 jobs are from 87 generic production and service occupations. 
There are fi ve levels of certifi cates for manual labors (including entry 
level, intermediate, and advanced skilled labor, and technician I and 
II) and three levels for service workers (i.e., entry level, intermediate, 
and advanced). Examples of MHRSS certifi cates include those for 
blue-collar workers, such as welder, turner, and fi tter, as well as those 
for professional workers, such as human resource manager, logistic 
manager, psychiatrist/psychological consultant, nutritionist, and IT 
manager. Professional associations or leading companies in the IT 
profession, such as Cisco Certifi ed Network Associate (CCNA) and 
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Microsoft Certifi ed Solutions Master (MCSM) for IT professionals, 
also provide certifi cates. 
Of the 1,055 MHRSS-certifi ed jobs, 90 are licensed.12 For these 
jobs, workers must obtain a license to work; without it, workers can-
not be employed or practice on their own. The employer who hires an 
unlicensed worker for these jobs will be given a warning and fi ned up 
to $160 per case. In addition to the 90 jobs, there are 31 other licensed 
professional occupations, including lawyer, medical doctor, nurse, 
pharmacist, accountant, real estate appraiser, architect, construction 
engineer, and urban planner. These occupations are regulated by other 
government agencies and separate laws.
The infl uence of occupational licensing on wage determination in 
China is consistent with that found in the United States and the UK. 
Empirical analysis for China fi nds that licensing is associated with 
an average of 15 percent higher wages and certifi cation with 13–14 
percent higher wages based on survey data collected for China (Chi, 
Kleiner, and Qian, forthcoming). The fi ndings are that the total frac-
tion of certifi ed or licensed workers in China is similar to that in the 
United States, but the licensing rate is likely signifi cantly lower. This 
outcome may be related to the historical development of certifi ca-
tion and licensing systems in China: the certifi cation system dated to 
the 1950s and preceded the licensing system; it was more prevalent 
than the licensing system, and licensing (for physicians, lawyers, and 
architects) was developed only in recent years. Physicians began to 
be licensed in 1998; licensing for lawyers started in 1996, and archi-
tect licensing in 1995. More recently, nurses have been licensed since 
2008. Given these factors, it is not surprising that certifi cation and 
licensing have similar infl uences on wage determination in China, 
given the historical evolution of these two institutions in that country.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Occupational licensing is a labor market institution that is impor-
tant not only in the United States but in many other countries around 
the world. This chapter has documented this and evaluated its impact 
in the EU, the UK, and China. The level of occupational licensing is 
lower in the EU than in the United States, but the range of licensing 
in each country in the EU is wide, with an overall estimate of 14–24 
percent. For one nation in the EU, the UK, there appears to be some 
growth in occupational licensing that is similar to that in the United 
States. Also, the infl uence on wage determination in the EU and China 
is not very different from the estimates on the wage determination in 
the United States, which is about 13 percent. In China the certifi ca-
tion of occupations evolved much earlier than occupational licensing 
and has been rapidly growing in recent years. Nevertheless, the infl u-
ence of licensing has been close to 14 percent, which is not far from 
the upper-bound estimate of 15–18 percent that has been found in 
the United States. The curious institution of occupational licensing 
is prevalent and has an important role in labor markets across many 
different nations and institutional contexts. 
Notes
 1.  See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifi cations/regprof/index
.cfm?action=homepage (accessed May 28, 2015).
 2. Persons carrying out obligatory military or community service are not 
included in the target group of the survey, as is also the case for persons 
in institutions/collective households.
 3.  For more details see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/
microdata/lfs (accessed May 29, 2015).
 4.  We focus on 2012, as it is the most recent available year in the EU 
Labour Force Survey data set. Some changes in regulation have occurred 
since then, but we cannot yet match them with labor force data. Earlier 
changes in the regulatory status of professions in European countries are 
not recorded in the EU Single Market Regulated Professions Database. 
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 5. The upper bound is computed by summing the proportion of workers 
in the regulated and mixed groups and assumes that all workers within 
the International Standard Classifi cation of Occupations (ISCO) codes 
are subject to regulation, while the lower bound is the proportion of 
workers in the regulated group and assumes that none of the workers 
within the remaining ISCO codes are regulated. The true prevalence of 
occupational regulation may lie anywhere in this interval.
 6.  The correlation between upper and lower bound is high (0.53) but dif-
ferent from 1. This is partly due to the variability across countries in the 
precision of occupational classifi cations in the European Labour Force 
Survey. Some countries (Latvia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
Italy, Cyprus, Germany, and Denmark) report relatively coarse occu-
pational codes in the European Labour Force Survey (three-digit level 
only). This implies that the interval between the upper and lower bounds 
is much larger. Lower bounds, for these countries, are particularly small, 
owing to the diffi culty in classifying workers as defi nitely subject to 
occupational licensing (Koumenta et al. 2014).
 7. The UK results are consistent with those reported by Bryson et al. 
(2012), allowing for some measurement error in both their and our 
calculations. 
 8.  “The Number of Individuals Taking the CPA Examination Exceeds 1.8 
Million in 2012” (in Chinese), China Accounting Net, February 17, 
2012. http://www.canet.com.cn/zhongji/zjdt/201202/17-237023.html 
(accessed April 2013).
 9.  The estimate of 10 million people who attained occupation certifi cates in 
2007 and the information about the survey of people’s attitudes toward 
obtaining occupational certifi cates are both sourced from a newspaper 
article in the China Youth Daily: “Lost in Certifi cation: Crazy for Cer-
tifi cation Exams” (in Chinese), College Information Net, May 4, 2008. 
http://campus.chsi.com.cn/xy/news/dt/200805/20080504/6258116.html 
(accessed April 2013).
 10.  “Eight Certifi cates Obtained in Four Years of College: Blindness in 
Certifi cation Exams,” February 2, 2011 (in Chinese), n.p. XinHua 
Net. http://www.xinhua08.com/life/jd/201102/t20110222_314951.html 
(accessed April 2013).
 11.  Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security’s Skill Certifi cation 
Center (in Chinese), May 2011. http://www.cettic.gov.cn/zyjnjd/zyjnbz/
2011-05/03/content_408249.htm (accessed April 2, 2013). 
 12.  Decree of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, No. 6, 
2000, effective since July 1, 2000 (in Chinese). http://www.molss.gov
.cn/gb/ywzn/2006-02/14/content_106425.htm (accessed April 2013).
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Chapter 6
Policy Implications of the Evolution 
of Occupational Licensing in the 
United States and Elsewhere
The impossibility of any individual or small group conceiving 
of all the possibilities, let alone evaluating their merits, is the 
great argument against central governmental planning and 
against arrangements such as professional monopolies that 
limit the possibilities of experimentation. On the other side, the 
great argument for the market is its tolerance of diversity; its 
ability to utilize a wide range of special knowledge and capac-
ity. It renders special groups impotent to prevent experimenta-
tion and permits the customers and not the producers to decide 
what will serve the customers best.
—Milton Friedman (1962, p. 160)
All professions are conspiracies against the laity.
—George Bernard Shaw (1906)
The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to pro-
tect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another 
to obtain money. When one does so through the practice of a 
calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public 
against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible. 
—Robert H. Jackson in Thomas v. Collins (1945)
This book explains how licensing is varied and expanding in the 
U.S. labor market and is pervasive around the world. Yet, the com-
ments above by Milton Friedman, George Bernard Shaw, and Robert 
Jackson state different views of the conceptual benefi ts and costs of 
occupational regulation. Within this context, what are potential policy 
implications of this growing labor market institution? This chapter 
identifi es several potential changes that may be helpful in improv-
ing the functioning of the labor market. More specifi cally, what poli-
cies should be developed to decide who can perform which functions 
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under the law? Certain policies can provide barriers to service pro-
visions and drive up costs. As an example, there are restrictions on 
what tasks can legally be undertaken by dental hygienists relative to 
dentists and nurse practitioners relative to physicians. Second, occu-
pational licensing is implemented by state boards, which can restrict 
geographic mobility and imposes labor market frictions. Third, by 
imposing time and monetary costs on the entry into certain occupa-
tions, licensing restricts job creation and impedes entrepreneurial 
activity. This can reduce innovation and creativity among a class 
of individuals as the Friedman comment above alludes to regarding 
innovation. For example, for electricians, an innovation such as plas-
tic wiring may require a different safety protocol than copper wir-
ing, but the licensing authority may require the older procedures. The 
delays in offi cial protocol and implementation may lead, for example, 
to workplace injuries for electricians (Kleiner 2013).
This chapter will propose several policy reforms that attempt 
to deal with the problems that occupational licensing creates in the 
labor market. The fi rst is the creation of federal guidelines, based 
on state economic and labor market conditions for occupational 
licensing boards. These guidelines will be established based on the 
demonstrated costs and benefi ts associated with licensing in various 
occupations or tasks. Second, the policy recommendations will sug-
gest greater reciprocity across state boundaries in the recognition of 
occupational licenses, and third, they will examine the use of certifi -
cation of occupations as an alternative for many current and emerging 
occupations.
Because occupational licensing varies by state, another channel 
through which licensing can affect employment is by reducing mobil-
ity. The patchwork of regulations raises the cost of cross-state mobil-
ity for workers in these occupations. This will result in slower adjust-
ment costs to regional economic shocks, which can result in higher 
unemployment. Licensing also can lead to higher prices for services 
because it restricts employment (Bond et al. 1980; Cox and Foster 
Kleiner 2015.indb   80 11/23/2015   1:34:33 PM
Policy Implications in the United States and Elsewhere   81
1990; Kleiner and Kudrle 2000; Kleiner and Todd 2009; Shepard 
1978).
While it is not possible to precisely estimate the effects of sub-
stantially reducing licensing, both the logic of the issue and the 
available evidence suggest that such a reduction could translate into 
signifi cantly higher employment, better job matches, and improved 
customer satisfaction. Low-income consumers, in particular, would 
benefi t because reduced barriers to entry would lower the prices of 
services provided, for example, from plumbers and electricians (Cox 
and Foster 1990; Shapiro 1986). Without doing a detailed analysis at 
the occupation-by-occupation and state level, it would be impossible 
to say which occupations can be justifi ed based on quality consider-
ation, though when studies have been conducted they have found at 
least in some cases that licensing reduces employment and increases 
prices but does not result in better services. For example, Kleiner and 
Kudrle (2000) fi nd that occupational licensing of dentists does not 
lead to improved measured dental outcomes but is associated with 
higher prices of certain services, likely because there are fewer den-
tists.1 Similarly, Kleiner and Todd (2009) fi nd that tougher licensing 
of mortgage brokers is not associated with fewer housing foreclosures 
but is related to higher-priced mortgages. 
The existing body of work completed on occupational licensing 
offers just a sample of the possible reforms that could be done. For 
example, a sensible reform that has been identifi ed is to allow dental 
hygienists to operate a practice without the supervision of a dentist. 
However, taking a piecemeal approach, I propose fi ve general reforms 
that states and localities could take that would rationalize future and 
existing regulations: 
 1)  Prospective evaluations. State and local governments 
should require benefi t-cost analysis prior to the new occu-
pational licensing requirements. The burden should be on 
the government together with the interest groups represent-
ing the occupation to demonstrate that the social benefi ts of 
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these requirements exceed the economic costs. If the bene-
fi ts to the public exceed the costs, governments and the 
interest groups should also demonstrate that the proposed 
regulations are the least restrictive means of furthering the 
goals of the regulations.2
 2)  Retrospective evaluations. State and local governments 
should develop and execute a plan to evaluate existing 
occupational licensing requirements. The evaluations could 
be based on existing studies or new analyses. When the 
costs of the evaluations are shown to exceed the benefi ts, 
the requirements should be modifi ed or dropped.
 3)  Reciprocity. When licensing is deemed to be in the interest 
of the public, weighed against the economic costs, states 
and localities should accept, as much as possible, licenses 
granted in other states. 
Proposal 3 would facilitate cross-state mobility and make it more 
diffi cult for special interests to tighten regulations in order to increase 
their monopoly power over the supply of labor in a given state. Under 
this proposal, targeting the 10 states with the most mobility between 
them would go a long way toward solving the problem.3
If state and local governments were to seriously undertake pro-
posals 1–3, the available evidence suggests that employment in these 
occupations would grow and monopoly rents would fall. The main 
fi scal cost on states would be from the loss of fees for occupational 
licenses. 
There is a way for governments to raise revenues while at the 
same time curtailing the use of occupational licensing and increasing 
employment:
 4)  Impose a surcharge or tax on workers in licensed occupa-
tions where there is evidence that the licensing leads to 
barriers to entry perhaps as much as the rents within the 
occupation.
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Proposal 4 is more unorthodox, but it is based on sound economic 
principles. When occupational licensing leads to entry barriers, work-
ers in those occupations enjoy monopoly rents. This surcharge would 
draw from those rents without adverse employment consequences. 
Moreover, as has been well documented, when there are employment 
restrictions, even if they can be justifi ed based on their benefi t to the 
public, special interest groups have incentives to tighten the restric-
tions beyond what is optimal. Taxing rents would reduce the incentive 
for these groups to engage in this kind of lobbying.
 5)  Certifi cation policies as a substitute for licensing.
Proposal 5 is based on the analysis of the benefi ts and costs of 
licensing; there may be some occupations where lesser forms of regu-
lation, such as certifi cation or registration, or even no regulation, may 
be benefi cial. For example, locksmiths, ballroom dance instructors, 
shampooers, interior designers, upholsters, pet groomers, and hair 
braiders may not pose suffi cient risk to health and safety to warrant 
the full regulation or “right to practice” of licensure. An additional 
policy would be to suggest that occupations such as these be moved 
by the state from licensing to certifi cation or other lesser forms of 
regulation or no regulation.
THE FEDERAL ROLE
Although there are occupational licensing requirements at the 
federal level, it is state and local rules that by far have the broad-
est reach. Research also has found that licensing has the most pro-
nounced effects when it is subject to multiple layers of jurisdiction. 
Local requirements tend to have less bite. For these reasons, the fed-
eral government is well suited to promote a set of best practices, such 
as those listed above. This could be achieved through a combination 
of moral suasion and monetary incentives. 
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Under this plan, states would be encouraged to submit a proposal 
that outlines specifi c steps they aim to take to reduce unnecessary 
licenses or allows licensed practitioners to more easily move between 
states, counties, or cities. The proposals should describe steps they 
plan to take to reduce barriers to entry in specifi c occupations (e.g., 
dental hygienists and nurse practitioners), as well as broader “pro-
cess” reforms they would undertake, such as 1–3 above. The plans 
would be reviewed by a panel of experts in the area that could include 
academics, business and labor leaders, and government offi cials, and 
a partial award would be distributed to the most meritorious plans, 
with the remaining amount withheld until certain benchmarks have 
been met. 
Because these practices do not impose a substantial fi scal bur-
den on states, the incentives do not have to be large for this to have 
an effect on state take-up. The incentives from the successful “Race 
to the Top” fund were $4.3 billion, which is far smaller than even 
conservative estimates of the costs of licensing. The monetary incen-
tives are scalable, but importantly on a dollar for dollar basis, their 
economic benefi ts are likely to exceed costs. As a start, the Obama 
administration submitted a budget that included a $15 million dollar 
appropriation to implement such a program (Porter 2015).
Calls to reduce occupational licensing barriers to interstate 
mobility have come from the executive branch of the U.S. federal 
government, including the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the 
U.S. Department of Defense (2012). These policy recommendations 
have been made in part because the families of military personnel 
have had a diffi cult time moving across states and pursuing their 
careers because of the variations in state licensing laws. The Depart-
ment of Defense views this effect as a hardship on military families. 
At a minimum, the ability to recognize other state licenses, similar 
to recognizing driver’s licenses across states, would serve to help 
military families as well as assist the economy in general in greatly 
reducing structural or frictional unemployment due to state regula-
tion barriers. It would also allow licensed workers to maximize their 
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incomes and productivity by enabling them to move across state lines 
without institutional constraints. In fact, in many cases it is harder to 
move across states for occupations such as dentists and optometrists 
because potential professionals have to take or retake examinations.
Licensing has also been cited as being a barrier for upward 
income mobility for individuals with low incomes or wealth. For 
example, occupational licensing was recently cited in Representative 
Paul Ryan’s (R-WI) national approach to reduce poverty in his 2014 
monograph, Expanding Opportunity in America (Ryan 2014, p. 66). 
He noted the following:
Another category of rules and regulations that can hurt low-
income families are state and local occupational-licensing 
regimes. These requirements often prevent workers from enter-
ing or advancing in the workforce. Government at all levels 
requires licenses to perform certain occupations. In some cases, 
such as medical doctors, this requirement is appropriate. How-
ever, in other cases, these licensing requirements merely protect 
entrenched incumbents. 
Eliminating irrational or unnecessary licensing requirements 
would not be a panacea, but it would open up new opportunities 
for low-income families and reduce costs for consumers. The 
vast majority of these licensing requirements are the result of 
state and local laws. State and local governments should begin 
to dismantle these barriers to upward mobility.
In concert with other federal programs that he identifi es in his 
monograph, Rep. Ryan sees reducing occupational regulation for 
low-income individuals as an important antipoverty program. Spe-
cifi cally, he sees reducing government barriers to entry into a job 
through occupational licensing as an element in reducing poverty in 
the United States (Ryan 2014). 
The federal government reimbursement or grant funding require-
ments also enhance the growth of occupational licensing. For exam-
ple, the federal government will deal with or fund only licensed sur-
veyors for contracts or grants involving surveying roads or parks. As 
a result, the states think they have the need to license surveyors. In 
health care, occupational therapists, in order to be reimbursed under 
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Medicare or other federal programs such as the Affordable Care Act, 
must have a state license. In these cases, the federal government puts 
pressure on the states to license additional occupations or ramp up the 
requirements to attain a license. 
AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Although occupational licensing has been growing, several pro-
posals have been made to slow its growth in favor of certifi cation. For 
example, in Minnesota the legislature passed a bill out of the Min-
nesota Senate Commerce and Consumer Protection Committee that 
explicitly favors certifi cation over licensing in both 2011 and 2012. 
The bill states that 
no government shall require an occupational license, certifi ca-
tion, registration, or other occupational regulation that imposes 
a substantial burden on the person unless the government dem-
onstrates that it has a compelling interest in protecting against 
present and recognizable harm to the public health and safety, 
and the regulation is the least restrictive means to furthering that 
compelling government interest. . . . [A]n individual who brings 
an action or asserts a defense under this section has the initial 
burden of proof that the statute or administrative rule or a gov-
ernment practice related to the statute or rule substantially bur-
dens the individual’s right to engage in an occupation not pro-
hibited by law. If the individual meets the burden of proof . . . 
the government must then demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the government has a compelling interest in 
protecting against present and recognizable harm to the pub-
lic health and safety, and the regulation is the least restrictive 
means for furthering that compelling governmental interest.4 
This is an illustration of “model legislation” on occupational 
licensing that is currently being proposed by the Institute for Justice, 
a libertarian public interest law fi rm that has handled numerous cases 
for individuals who have challenged occupational licensing laws on 
the grounds that they limit free speech or the freedom to work.
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The proposed Minnesota statute goes a long way toward favoring 
a policy of the least possible regulation of occupations by the gov-
ernment, and it allows the courts to determine whether an individual 
has been economically harmed or if there are compelling health and 
safety issues that warrant the occupation to be licensed. Consequently, 
the burden of proof shifts from the individual to the state, which must 
show that there is a potential health and safety hazard from an indi-
vidual not being licensed in order to perform their job tasks. One 
possible drawback of the proposed licensing regulation in Minnesota 
is the increased litigation costs if individuals who thought that they 
could do the work were engaged in a signifi cant number of lawsuits. 
The legal costs could be balanced by the reduction in economic rents 
to the members of the licensed occupations and increased aggregate 
output for the services of the members of the licensed occupations. 
Other states have also moved toward deregulating occupations 
but use somewhat different approaches. For example, as was men-
tioned in Chapter 1, in April 2014, the governor of Indiana signed 
legislation called the Senate Enrolled Act 421, which required the 
Indiana Professional Licensing Agency to study and establish a com-
mission on the concept of self-certifi cation registration as an alterna-
tive to licensing and issue a report to the legislative council before 
October 1, 2014. According to the governor, the report must include 
the following:
• occupations that may be included on the list
• whether to provide title protection for the individuals included 
on the list (a form of certifi cation)
• enforcement provisions that would be used
• a description of auditing and maintenance of the list
• the cost of establishing and maintaining a list
• the cost of an individual applying for and renewing inclusion 
on the list
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A potential result of the commission is the conversion of most of 
Indiana’s licenses to voluntary private certifi cations for a wide variety 
of occupations, most of which are non-health-related ones. In addi-
tion, it would allow citizens to add their names and private certifi ca-
tion numbers to a state-run registry. The changes aim to move the reg-
ulatory process toward private sector accreditation rather than public 
boards, which are often dominated by the members of the occupation. 
However, the private sector monitors also may be subject to pres-
sures to limit entry by the occupations they serve. For example, credit 
agencies failed to monitor fi nancial institutions during the fi nancial 
crisis of 2008 because they were intimidated by the larger banks and 
afraid that they might lose their business. An additional issue is that 
states sometimes abrogate their oversight duties by allowing the pro-
fessional associations to set standards that are often beyond what is 
needed for health and safety. For example, in many states, the educa-
tional licensing standards for physical therapists come from the pro-
fessional association’s boilerplate policy and may not consider what 
is best for the patient or for competent care, prices, and access to the 
services. Consequently, the professional associations establish the de 
facto terms of entry and reciprocity rather than the state licensing 
boards.
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ISSUES 
Occupational regulation is an important labor market institution 
in the EU, and it is growing in China. It is becoming a dominant labor 
market institution in the EU, covering up to one-quarter of the labor 
force, although the vast majority of occupations in China are certifi ed 
rather than licensed (Chi, Kleiner, and Qian, forthcoming). It deserves 
more attention than it currently has been receiving by researchers and 
policymakers. The EU Commission has focused its policy on reduc-
ing barriers to mobility and fostering labor movement within the EU 
(Koumenta et al. 2014). Although some of the research has not found 
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any major infl uence of the legal restrictions on migration, EU policy-
makers should not ignore the fact that becoming licensed involves a 
cost to the individual, not the least in relation to the skill and location-
specifi c investments it entails. While steps toward reciprocity can 
partly address the former, the latter still remains a key consideration 
in an individual’s cost-benefi t analysis to migrate. In addition, the 
length of time that occupational licensing has been in effect and the 
stringency of the entry requirements are both better predictors of a 
wage premium than whether the occupation is licensed in the EU. 
The wage effects of occupational licensing in the UK are similar to 
those found in the United States when human capital factors are taken 
into account, suggesting that there are economic returns to licensing 
in the UK. 
Similarly, occupational regulation in China is rapidly increas-
ing. The national occupational regulation system in China is different 
from the U.S. system of primarily state-by-state regulation. Similarly, 
China has occupational certifi cation and licensing regulations. Using 
imputation based on occupation code and licensing rules, 9 percent of 
respondents would be licensed in 2003 (Chi, Kleiner, and Qian, forth-
coming). This is much lower than the U.S. rate of about 29 percent in 
2006. However, the wage effects are remarkably similar, showing the 
infl uence of occupational licensing to be about 14 percent. Again, the 
infl uence of licensing seems to be a fairly robust phenomenon across 
different nations and institutional settings.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICY
This book provides a detailed, nontechnical overview of occu-
pational licensing in the United States, China, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union for students of the labor market, consumers, 
the public, and policymakers. Occupational licensing is an institution 
that rarely is discussed or receives the media attention that its size and 
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scope warrant. It makes up about 29 percent of the U.S. workforce, 
up to 24 percent of the workforce in the EU, about 14 percent in the 
UK, and about 9 percent in China. The book examines the institution 
of occupational licensing from a historical perspective and offers a 
rationale for its existence and costs, an international perspective, and 
policy implications. 
A major argument for licensing occupations is that it eliminates 
or reduces the consumer’s risk of seeking the services from practitio-
ners of an occupation. If testing and background checks “eliminate 
charlatans, incompetents or frauds” (Council of State Governments 
1952), then consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for the 
services offered by the regulated occupation. A review of the body of 
theory from experimental economics and psychology shows that con-
sumers value the reduction in downside risk more than they value the 
benefi ts of a positive outcome. This consumer preference for reducing 
the risk of a highly negative outcome has been called “loss aversion,” 
which is an element of the prospect theory developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). For example, social welfare may be increased 
substantially by minimizing the likelihood of a poor outcome as a 
consequence of going to an incompetent physician, because the 
incompetent physicians have been weeded out as a result of licens-
ing. Consequently, occupational licensing may also reduce patients’ 
perceived benefi ts of receiving nonstandard but potentially highly 
effective treatment from an unlicensed practitioner of nontraditional 
medicine. Using the power of the state to both limit the downside risk 
of poor quality care and reduce the possibility of an upside benefi t 
may be a trade-off that maximizes consumer utility or welfare. Evi-
dence of the acceptance of this trade-off can be found in the growth 
of occupational licensing during the past century in many countries 
(Kleiner 2006).
The gains from an unregulated service can be potential benefi ts 
from greater free market competition of lower prices and greater 
innovation without the constraints of a regulatory body, such as a 
licensing board. The upside potential gain can be achieved through 
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both the use of nonstandard methods or new research that has not 
been approved by the licensing agency as appropriate for the medi-
cal service (Rottenberg 1980). Deviations from prescribed methods 
of providing a service are discouraged by licensing boards and may 
even be found to be illegal. For example, not having a dentist on-site 
is illegal in the United States when providing a service such as teeth 
cleaning in some states. Dental hygienists generally are not allowed 
to “practice” without a dentist on-site, with the “site” being defi ned 
by statute or the dental board. In addition, dental hygienists gener-
ally are not allowed to open offi ces to compete with dentists in most 
states. Although this policy reduces the chance that a dental hygienist 
will fail to fi nd a major disease that may require immediate attention, 
it also reduces the ability of the hygienist to provide the limited ser-
vices that particular patients say they want. Moreover, there is little 
leeway for the dental service industry to provide new or innovative 
services without the risk of being found in violation of the licensing 
laws. The licensing laws give rise to the labor relations concept of 
“featherbedding,” whereby in this case, dentists are required to be on 
the premises but do little observable productive work. 
 Consequently, for medical services, regulation through licensing 
can be the equivalent of a closed shop in unionized markets. Theo-
retically, higher wages are likely to result from restricted labor sup-
ply. Because closed shops in unionized markets are illegal in both 
the United States as a result of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
National Labor Relations Act and in the UK, it is interesting that, 
with respect to organized labor markets, a similar restriction to closed 
shops is nevertheless permitted in licensed medical occupations.
Certifi cation grants title (occupational right-to-title) protection to 
persons meeting predetermined standards. It is often thought of as a 
better policy alternative than occupational licensing for three reasons:
 1) Certifi cation has benefi ts over licensing for workers. It does 
not fence out workers or cause the type of problems in labor 
markets that licensing does. Licensing may cause workers to 
lose the opportunity for upward mobility because of the bar-
Kleiner 2015.indb   91 11/23/2015   1:34:35 PM
92   Kleiner
riers to entry. A reduction in licensing requirements could 
enhance employment growth prospects in the state. Licens-
ing further reduces the ability of workers to move across 
state lines and engage in work that is the most benefi cial 
to them and to society. Certifi cation of practitioners, when 
properly managed, does not have these negative features. 
 2) It is better for consumers. Similar to licensing, certifi cation 
sends a signal to consumers about who has met the govern-
ment’s requirements. However, it does not reduce compe-
tition and gives consumers more choices for the kinds of 
services they want.
 3) Certifi cation can reduce the unnecessary and often exces-
sive lobbying by occupational associations to try to con-
vince legislators to enact licensing regimes under the 
assumption of protecting the public. 
Moving to a system of certifi cation rather than occupational 
licensing gives consumers more choices and provides useful informa-
tion about the purveyor of the service. Many consumers and politi-
cians say licensing protects against “loss aversion” and may be worth 
the costs of granting monopoly power to an occupation. In other 
words, consumers respond more to knowledge about bad services 
than good conditions, which suggests that they respond more to infor-
mation that reduces their utility than to information that increases 
it; this is consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). To illustrate, for an uninformed consumer who is considering 
brain surgery, licensing provides the guarantee that the provider of 
a service has at least fi nished medical school and taken a licensing 
exam. Nevertheless, a doctor who specializes in pediatrics and has 
never performed major surgery could legally perform brain surgery 
under most state licensing laws. Under certifi cation, anyone who is 
not a certifi ed brain surgeon could not argue that she has completed 
the course and passed the appropriate exams and claim to be a brain 
surgeon. If she claimed to be certifi ed and was not, she would face 
legal penalties determined by the state. She could, however, legally 
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perform the operation with the patient’s consent. Under a regime of 
certifi cation, the patient could have the surgery completed by a certi-
fi ed brain surgeon, a pediatrician, or a medical technician who has 
access to the latest technology on brain surgery. Information on all 
alternatives would be available to the consumer of the service, but 
insurance companies could put constraints on consumer decisions 
based on their knowledge of the procedure and legal liability issues. 
Lists and reviews of practitioners similar to those maintained by 
the Better Business Bureau or Angie’s List, a consumer-based service 
review website, provide some protection, but they have little enforce-
ment powers beyond moral suasion. A central monitoring authority 
like the state, which screens potential applicants and provides greater 
assurance about the abilities of the individual, would be more use-
ful, especially for low-income individuals or those with mental or 
physical disabilities. Without this enforceable “title protection,” little 
quality assurance could be provided to the public on this listing of 
practitioners. The cost of being removed from the list of registered 
practitioners without the legal penalties of having “inappropriate 
skills” or competence may lead to insuffi cient consumer knowledge 
of the quality of the skill. 
Without the legal costs of title infringement, service providers 
would have little economic incentive to be honest. Furthermore, it 
may not provide suffi cient protection for providers of the occupation 
to undertake the investments that are required to advance in the fi eld. 
If low-quality practitioners can claim to have the skills and expertise 
to perform a task, then optimal investments in human capital acquisi-
tion may not take place. Unlike lesser forms of regulation, certifi ca-
tion allows consumers to select only those who have met the certifi ca-
tion requirements established by the profession or any other services, 
and it allows for the purchase of lower-quality service but without the 
brand. This market alternative under certifi cation can serve as dis-
cipline for the professions to not greatly limit barriers to entry. In 
conclusion, the central policy question for occupational licensing is, 
to what extent should the government protect the consumer and their 
families against their own bad decisions?
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Notes
 1.  For additional examples see Carroll and Gaston (1981).
 2.  This proposal was recently introduced in the Minnesota State Legisla-
ture (2012).
 3.  Between 1995 and 2000, the 10 state pairs with the largest gross mobil-
ity between them were (New York, Florida), (New York, New Jersey), 
(California, Nevada), (California, Texas), (California, Arizona), (Flori-
da, Georgia), (California, Washington), (California, Oregon), (Califor-
nia, Colorado), and (New Jersey, Pennsylvania). 
 4.  For a detailed explanation of the statute, see Minnesota H.F. No. 2002, 
as introduced in the 87th Legislative Session (2011–2012), posted on 
the state website February 1, 2012 (Minnesota State Legislature 2012).
Kleiner 2015.indb   94 11/23/2015   1:34:35 PM
95
References
Akerlof, George A. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 
488–500.
Alexander, Adrienne, Chris Henjum, Jeremy Jones, Meg Luger-Nikolai, 
Aaron Rosenberger, and Caro Smith. 2009. Regulating Interior Design-
ers, Overview and Analysis of Public Policy. Minneapolis, MN: Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
American Occupational Therapy Association. 2014. “Scope of Practice—
Defi nition of Occupational Therapy.” Bethesda, MD: American Occu-
pational Therapy Association. https://www.aota.org/-/media/Corporate/
Files/AboutAOTA/Offi cialDocs/Position/Scope-of-Practice-edited-2014
.PDF (accessed July 9, 2015).
American Society of Interior Designers (ASID). 2005. The History of ASID: 
30 Years of Advancing the Interior Design Profession. Washington, DC: 
American Society of Interior Designers. http://asidcanv.org/students/
student-legislative-resources (accessed July 9, 2015).
———. 2010. “Georgia Governor Signs Legislation to Recognize Registered 
Interior Designers.” Press release. Washington, DC: American Society of 
Interior Designers.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jonathan Guryan. 2003. “Does Teacher Testing 
Raise Teacher Quality? Evidence from State Certifi cation Requirements.” 
NBER Working Paper No. 9545. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research.
Apgar, William, Amal Bendimerad, and Ren S. Essene. 2007. Mortgage Mar-
ket Channels and Fair Lending: An Analysis of HDMA Data. Cambridge, 
MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University.
Associated Press. 2013. “Pence Vetos License Bills for Dieticians, Oth-
ers.” http://www.ibj.com/pence-vetoes-license-bills-for-dietitians-others/
PARAMS/article/41250 (accessed July 10, 2015). 
Baker, Samuel. 1984. “Physician Licensure Laws in the United States, 1865–
1915.” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 10(2): 
173–197.
Beck, Andrew. 2004. “The Flexner Report and the Standardization of Ameri-
can Medical Education.” Journal of the American Medical Association 
29(17): 2139–2140.
Benson, Johann, Jonathan Dworin, Thomas Garry, Jason Hicks, Teresa M. 
Schicker, and Anders Victor. 2014. “Diagnosing Healthcare in America: 
Impacts of Immigrants and Occupational Licensing.” Professional paper. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, Humphrey School of Public 
Affairs.
Kleiner 2015.indb   95 11/23/2015   1:34:36 PM
96   Kleiner
Bond, Ronald, John E. Kwoka Jr., John J. Phelan, and Ira Taylor Whitten. 
1980. Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in 
the Professions: The Case of Optometry. Staff report. Washington, DC: 
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. 
Branstad, Terry. 2013. “Licensure Legislation Vetoed by Governor 
Branstad.” Ankeny, IA: Iowa Board of Certification. http://www
.iowabc.org/PDFs/Letter_from_IBC_President.pdf (accessed July 14, 
2015). 
Bryson, Alex, John Forth, Amy Humphris, Morris M. Kleiner, and Maria 
Koumenta. 2012. “The Incidence and Labor Market Outcomes of Occu-
pational Regulation in the UK.” Paper presented at the Allied Social Sci-
ence Associations annual meeting, held in Chicago, January 5–8.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2012. Occupational Employment Statistics. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://
www.bls.gov/oes/ (accessed December 12, 2012). 
———. 2014. Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2014–15 ed. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls
.gov/ooh/healthcare/physical-therapists.htm (accessed October 17, 2014).
Carpenter, Dick M. II, Lisa Knepper, Angela C. Erickson, and John K. Ross. 
2012. License to Work: A National Study of Burdens from Occupational 
Licensing. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice. 
Carroll, Sidney L., and Robert Gaston. 1981. “Occupational Restrictions and 
the Quality of Service Received: Some Evidence.” Southern Economic 
Journal 47(4): 959–976.
Cartter, Allan M. 1959. Theory of Wages and Employment. Homewood, IL: 
R.D. Irwin. 
Cathles, Alison, David E. Harrington, and Kathy Krynski. 2010. “The Gen-
der Gap in Funeral Directors: Burying Women with Ready-to-Embalm 
Laws?” British Journal of Industrial Relations 48(4): 688–705.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2014. “National Health 
Expenditures Fact Sheet.” Washington, DC: Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
NHE-Fact-Sheet.html (accessed September 15, 2015).
Chi, Wei, Morris M. Kleiner, and Xiaoye Qian. Forthcoming. “Do Occupa-
tional Regulations Increase Earnings? Evidence from China.” Industrial 
Relations. 
China Statistical Yearbook. 2003–2010. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 
National Bureau of Statistics in China.
Council of State Governments. 1952. Occupational Licensing Legislation in 
the States. Chicago: Council of State Governments.
Cox, Carolyn, and Susan Foster. 1990. The Costs and Benefi ts of Occupa-
Kleiner 2015.indb   96 11/23/2015   1:34:36 PM
References   97
tional Regulation. Washington, DC: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade 
Commission. 
Cutler, David, and Ernst Berndt. 2001. “Introduction.” In Medical Care Out-
put and Productivity, David Cutler and Ernst Berndt, eds. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, pp. 1–11.
Dent v. West Virginia 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
Dranias, Nick. 2007. The Land of 10,000 Lakes Drowns Entrepreneurs in 
Regulations. Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice.
Dueker, Michael J., Ada K. Jacox, David E. Kalist, and Stephen J. Spurr. 2005. 
“The Practice Boundaries of Advanced Practice Nurses: An Economic 
and Legal Analysis.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 27(3): 309–330.
Edlin, Aaron, and Rebecca Haw. 2014. “Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?” University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review 162: 1093–1164.
Federman, Maya N., David E. Harrington, and Kathy J. Krynski. 2006. “The 
Impact of State Licensing Regulations on Low-Skilled Immigrants: The 
Case of Vietnamese Manicurists.” American Economic Review 96(2): 
237–241.
Feldman, Roger, and James W. Begun. 1978. “The Effects of Advertising: 
Lessons from Optometry.” Journal of Human Resources 13(Supplement): 
247–262.
Fisher, Gail, and Mary Keehn. 2007. “Workforce Needs and Issues in 
Occupational and Physical Therapy.” Chicago: University of Illinois 
at Chicago. http://www.westga.edu/~distance/ojdla/spring161/workforce
.pdf (accessed May 29, 2015).
Fitzgerald, F. Scott. 2008. The Curious Case of Benjamin Button and Other 
Jazz Age Stories. New York: Penguin Books. (Previously published as 
Jazz Age Stories. 1922. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.)
Fixler, Dennis, and Mitchell Ginsburg. 2001. “Health Care Output and Prices 
in the Producer Price Index.” In Medical Care Output and Productiv-
ity, David Cutler and Ernst Berndt, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 221–270.
Flexner, Abraham.1910. Medical Education in the United States and Can-
ada: A Report to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teach-
ing. Bulletin No. 4. New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement 
of Teaching, p. 346.
Ford, Ina Kay, and Daniel H. Ginsburg. 2001. “Medical Care in the Con-
sumer Price Index.” In Medical Care Output and Productivity, David M. 
Cutler and Ernst R. Berndt, eds. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
pp. 203–219.
Freeman, Richard B. 2008. America Works: Critical Thoughts on the Excep-
tional U.S. Labor Market. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kleiner 2015.indb   97 11/23/2015   1:34:36 PM
98   Kleiner
Freeman, Richard B., and Morris M. Kleiner. 1990. “The Impact of New 
Unionization on Wages and Working Conditions.” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 8(1): S8–S25.
Freeman, Richard B., and James L. Medoff. 1984. What Do Unions Do? New 
York: Basic Books.
Friedman, Lawrence. 1965. “Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licens-
ing, 1890–1910: A Legal and Social Study.” California Law Review 53(1): 
487–534.
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Friedman, Milton, and Rose Friedman. 1980. Free to Choose: A Personal 
Statement. Boston: Houghton Miffl in. 
———. 1998. Two Lucky People: Memoirs. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Friedman, Milton, and Simon Kuznets. 1945. Income from Independent 
Professional Practice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Gittleman, Maury, Mark A. Klee, and Morris M. Kleiner. 2015. “Analyzing 
the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational Licensing.” NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 20961. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Gittleman, Maury, and Morris M. Kleiner. Forthcoming. “Wage Effects of 
Unionization and Occupational Licensing Coverage in the United States.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
Greene, Karen. 1969. “Occupational Licensing and the Supply of Nonprofes-
sional Manpower.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor.
Gross, Stanley. 1984. Of Foxes and Hen Houses: Licensing and the Health 
Professions. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. 
Ham, Hwikwon, and Morris M. Kleiner. 2007. “Do Industrial Relations 
Institutions Infl uence Foreign Direct Investment? Evidence from OECD 
Nations.” Industrial Relations 46(2): 305–328. 
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Han, Suyoun, and Morris M. Kleiner. 2015. “Analyzing the Duration of 
Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market.” Paper presented at the 
Labor and Employment Relations Association Meetings, held in Pitts-
burgh, PA, May 30.
Harper, Doreen C., and Jean Johnson. 1998. “The New Generation of Nurse 
Practitioners: Is More Enough?” Health Affairs 17(5): 158–164.
Holen, Arlene. 1965. “Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on 
Interstate Labor Mobility and Resource Allocation.” Journal of Political 
Economy 73(5): 492–498.
Kleiner 2015.indb   98 11/23/2015   1:34:36 PM
References   99
———. 1978. The Economics of Dental Licensing. Arlington, VA: Public 
Research Institute of the Center for Naval Analysis.
Humphris, Amy. 2013. “Conversations on Occupational Licensing.” PhD 
thesis. London School of Economics.
Humphris, Amy, Morris M. Kleiner, and Maria Koumenta. 2011. “How Does 
Government Regulate Occupations in the United Kingdom and the United 
States? Issues and Policy Implications.” In Employment in the Lean Years: 
Policy and Prospects for the Next Decade, David Marsden, ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 87–101.
Jacobides, Michael G. 2005. “Industry Change through Vertical Disintegra-
tion: How and Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking.” Academy of 
Management Journal 48(3): 465–498.
Johnson, Janna, and Morris M. Kleiner. 2015. “Does Occupational Licensing 
Reduce Interstate Migration?” Paper presented at the W.E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research, July 30.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1991. “The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 5(1): 193–206.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47(2): 263–292.
Kaplan, Greg, and Samuel Schulhofer-Wohl. 2012. “Understanding the 
Long-Run Decline in Interstate Migration.” Working paper. Minneapolis, 
MN: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Kapp, Diana. 2014. “When Uber Is the Family Chauffeur.” Wall Street Jour-
nal, December 18, D:1–D:2.
Kleiner, Morris. 2000. “Occupational Licensing.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 14(4): 189–202.
———. 2006. Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting 
Competition? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research. 
———. 2013. Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
———. 2015. Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution.
Kleiner, Morris M., Robert S. Gay, and Karen Greene. 1982. “Barriers to 
Labor Migration: The Case of Occupational Licensing.” Industrial Rela-
tions 21(3): 383–391.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Alan B. Krueger. 2010. “The Prevalence and Effects 
of Occupational Licensing.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 48(4): 
676–687.
———. 2013. “Analyzing the Extent and Infl uence of Occupational Licensing 
on the Labor Market.” Journal of Labor Economics 31(2): S173– S202.
Kleiner 2015.indb   99 11/23/2015   1:34:36 PM
100   Kleiner
Kleiner, Morris M., Alan B. Krueger, and Alex Mas. 2011. “A Proposal to 
Encourage States to Rationalize Occupational Licensing Practices.” 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
Kleiner, Morris M., and Robert T. Kudrle. 2000. “Does Regulation Affect 
Economic Outcomes? The Case of Dentistry.” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 43(2): 547–582.
Kleiner, Morris, and Marta Lachowska. 2014. “The Deregulation of Profes-
sions in Poland.” Proposal submitted to the European Union Commission, 
February.
Kleiner, Morris, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park, and Coady Wing. 2014. 
“Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and 
Prices for a Medical Service.” NBER Working Paper No. 9906. Cam-
bridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Kyoung Won Park. 2010. “Battles among Licensed 
Occupations: Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Out-
comes for Dentists and Hygienists.” NBER Working Paper No. 16560. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Daniel L. Petree. 1988. “Unionism and Licensing of 
Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output.” In 
When Public Sector Workers Unionize, Richard B. Freeman and Casey 
Ichniowski, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 305–322.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Richard M. Todd. 2009. “Mortgage Broker Regula-
tions That Matter: Analyzing Earnings, Employment, and Outcomes for 
Consumers.” In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, David Autor, ed. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 183–231.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Evgeny S. Vorotnikov. 2012. “Complementarities 
and Substitutions between a Licensed and a Certifi ed Occupation: An 
Analysis of Architects and Interior Designers.” Presented at the Society 
for the Advancement of Socio-Economics annual conference, held in 
Cambridge, MA, June 28–30.
———. 2015. “The Economic Effects of Occupational Licensing among the 
States.” Working paper. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
Kleiner, Morris M., and David Weil. 2012. “Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
National Labor Relations Act Remedies: Analysis and Comparison with 
Other Workplace Penalty Policies.” In Research Handbook on the Eco-
nomics of Labor and Employment Law, Cynthia L. Estlund and Michael 
L. Wachter, eds. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, pp. 209–247. 
Koumenta, Maria, Amy Humphris, Morris Kleiner, and Mario Pagliero. 2014. 
Occupational Regulation in the EU and UK: Prevalence and Labour 
Market Impact. Final report. London: Queen Mary University of London.
Kwoka, John E. Jr. 1984. “Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optomet-
ric Services.” American Economic Review 74(1): 211–216.
Kleiner 2015.indb   100 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
References   101
Langford, Carol. 2009. “Barbarians at the Bar: Regulation of the Legal Pro-
fession through the Admissions Process.” Hofstra Law Review Winter: 
1193–1224.
Lee, David S., and Alexandre Mas. 2012. “Long-Run Impacts of Unions on 
Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 127(1): 333–378.
Liang, J. Nellie, and Jonathan D. Ogur. 1987. Restrictions on Dental Auxilia-
ries. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.
Lieb, David A. 2008. “Senate Bill Would Allow Nurses to Write More Pre-
scriptions.” Missourian, July 22. http://www.columbiamissourian.com/
news/local/senate-bill-would-allow-nurses-to-write-more-prescriptions/
article_6920730a-7ac0-5cae-9a3d-51b1c5102e7b.html (accessed July 23, 
2015).
Liptak, Adam. 2014. “Regulatory Case in North Carolina Appears to Trouble 
Supreme Court.” New York Times, October 14, A:24.
Lowry, Michael. 2009. “AIA Georgia Legislative Announcement HB 231 on 
the Floor Wed., 2/11/09.” http://www.aiaga.affi niscape.com/associations/
7807/fi les/Your%20email%20Legislative%20Alert%20-%20HB231%20
has%20been%20sent.htm (accessed April 22, 2012).
Lowry, Michael, and Fred Perpall. 2009. “A Letter from Michael Lowry, AIA 
and Fred Perpall, AIA.” http://www.aiaga.affi niscape.com/displaycommon
.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=231 (accessed April 22, 2012).
Marier, Allison, and Coady Wing. 2014. “Effects of Occupational Regula-
tions on the Cost of Dental Services: Evidence from Dental Insurance 
Claims.” Journal of Health Economics 34: 131–143.
Maurizi, Alex R. 1980. “The Impact of Regulation of Quality: The Case 
of California Contractors.” In Occupational Licensure and Regulation, 
Simon Rottenberg, ed. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, pp. 399–413.
McQuaide, Terry. 2007. “Expert Diagnosis: Should Nurses Be Able to Pre-
scribe Controlled Drugs in Missouri?” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 
31. 
Metcalf, David, and Mark Stewart. 1992. “Closed Shops and Relative Pay: 
Institutional Arrangements or High Density?” Bulletin 54: 503–516.
Miller, John W. 2004. “Europe’s ‘Oudated’ Job Rules: Some Say Certifi ca-
tion Requirements Hinder EU Productivity.” Wall Street Journal, August 
16, A:11.
Minnesota State Legislature. 2012. HF 2002, as Introduced. St. Paul, MN: 
Minnesota State Legislature. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php
?number=HF2002&session=ls87&version=list&session_number=0
&session_year=2012 (accessed July 22, 2013).
Molloy, Raven, Christopher L. Smith, and Abigail Wozniak. 2011. “Inter-
Kleiner 2015.indb   101 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
102   Kleiner
nal Migration in the United States.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
25(3): 173–196.
Moretti, Enrico. 2012. The New Geography of Jobs. New York: Mariner 
Books.
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion (2014).
Ogilvie, Sheilagh. 2014. “The Economics of Guilds.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 28(4): 169–192.
Pahl, Cynthia J. 2007. A Compilation of State Mortgage Broker Laws and 
Regulations, 1996–2006. Community Affairs Report No. 2007-2. Min-
neapolis, MN: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. http://www
.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4983 
(accessed May 1, 2013).
Paler, Laura. 2005. “China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More 
Orderly and Representative Legislative System.” China Quarterly 182: 
301–318.
Pashigian, Peter B. 1979. “Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobil-
ity of Professionals.” Journal of Law and Economics 22(1): 1–25.
———. 1980. “Has Occupational Licensing Reduced Geographical Mobil-
ity and Raised Earnings?” In Occupational Licensing and Regulation, 
Simon Rottenberg, ed. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 
pp. 299–333.
Paul, Charles. 1982. “Physician Licensure Legislation and the Quality of 
Medical Care.” Atlantic Economic Journal 12(4): 18–30.
Pettypiece, Shannon. 2013. “Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Better.” Bloom-
berg Business Week, March 11–17, pp. 27–28.
Phelan, J. 1974. “Regulation of the Television Repair Industry in Louisiana 
and California: A Case Study.” Washington DC: Bureau of Economics of 
the Federal Trade Commission. 
Porter, Eduardo. 2015. “Job Licenses in Spotlight as Uber Rises.” New York 
Times, January 27, B:1. 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce (Poland). 2012. “Deregulation Concerning Access to 
Certain Professions.” March 3. Warsaw, Poland: Prime Minister’s Offi ce.
Raphael, Steven. 2014. The New Scarlet Letter? Negotiating the U.S. Labor 
Market with a Criminal Record. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research.    
Reynolds, Jeff. 2015. “Idaho Governor Otter Vetoes New Regulations on 
Sign-Language Interpreters.” Heartland News, April 24. http://news
.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2015/04/24/idaho-gov-otter-vetoes
-new-regulations-sign-language-interpreters (accessed July 10, 2015). 
Rose, Nancy L., ed. 2014. Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have 
We Learned? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Kleiner 2015.indb   102 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
References   103
Rottenberg, Simon. 1980. “Introduction.” In Occupational Licensure and 
Regulation, Simon Rottenberg, ed. Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute, pp. 1–10. 
Ryan, Paul, 2014. Expanding Opportunity in America: A Discussion Draft 
from the House Budget Committee, Washington, DC, Committee on the 
Budget, U.S. House of Representatives.
Santayana, George. 1905. The Life of Reason: Introduction and Reason in 
Common Sense. Vol. 7, Book 1. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Shaw, George Bernard. 1906. The Doctor’s Dilemma. Royal Court Theater, 
Liverpool.
Schmidt, James A. Jr. 2012. “New and Larger Costs of Monopoly and Tar-
iffs.” Economic Policy Paper 12-5. Minneapolis, MN: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis. 
Shapiro, Carl. 1986. “Investment, Moral Hazard and Occupational Licens-
ing.” Review of Economic Studies 53(5): 843–862.
Shepard, Lawrence. 1978. “Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental 
Care.” Journal of Law and Economics 21(1): 187–201.
Stange, Kevin. 2011. “Occupational Licensing and the Growth of Nurse 
Practitioners and Physician Assistants: Effects on Prices, Quantity, and 
Access.” Working paper. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.
Tenn, Steven Aaron. 2001. “Three Essays on the Relationship between Migra-
tion and Occupational Licensing.” Unpublished dissertation. Department 
of Economics, University of Chicago. 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945).
Triplett, Jack E. 2001. “What’s Different about Health? Human Repair and 
Car Repair in National Accounts and in National Health Accounts.” In 
Medical Care Output and Productivity, David M. Cutler and Ernst R. 
Berndt, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 15–96. 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense. 2012. Sup-
porting Our Military Families: Best Practices for Streamlining Occupa-
tional Licensing across State Lines. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense.
U.S. Executive Offi ce of the President. 2013. “The Fast Track to Civilian 
Employment: Streamlining Credentialing and Licensing for Service 
Members, Veterans, and Their Spouses.” Washington, DC: The White 
House, p. 27.
———. 2015. “Occupational Licensing: A Framework for Policymakers.” 
Washington, DC: The White House, p. 76.
Wheelan, Charles J. 1998. “Politics or Public Interest? An Empirical Exami-
nation of Occupational Licensing.” Unpublished dissertation, University 
of Chicago.
Kleiner 2015.indb   103 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
Kleiner 2015.indb   104 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
105
Author
Morris M. Kleiner is a professor at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs, 
and he teaches at the Center for Human Resources and Labor Studies, both at 
the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities. He has received many university 
teaching awards for classes in public affairs, business, and economics. He is 
a research associate in labor studies with the National Bureau of Economic 
Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and he serves as a visiting scholar 
in the economic research department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis. He has been a professor at the University of Kansas, an associate 
in employment policy with the Brookings Institution, a visiting scholar in 
the Harvard University economics department, a visiting researcher in the 
Industrial Relations Section at Princeton University, a visiting scholar at the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, and a research fellow at the 
London School of Economics. He received a doctorate in economics from 
the University of Illinois. He began his research on occupational licensing 
at the U.S. Department of Labor in 1976, while working for the Brookings 
Institution. His work has been supported by the National Science Foundation, 
the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
United Kingdom Commission for Employment and Skills, the Smith Rich-
ardson Foundation, the Kauffman Foundation, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. In the United States, Professor Kleiner has pro-
vided advice on occupational regulation policy to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Justice, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, federal interagency statistical panels, state legislatures, and occupational 
licensing associations. Internationally, he has provided testimony on occupa-
tional regulation to United Kingdom cabinet offi cers and their parliamentary 
committees, to cabinet offi cials responsible for occupational regulation in 
Australia, and to offi cials of the European Union.  
Kleiner 2015.indb   105 11/23/2015   1:34:37 PM
Kleiner 2015.indb   106 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
107
Index
The italic letters f, n, or t following a page number indicate a fi gure, note, or table on 
that page. Double letters mean more than one such item appear on a single page.
Accreditation. See Certifi cates
Advertising, quality information in, 41,  
 62
Affordable Care Act, 86
Agricultural occupations, beekeepers, 63
AIA. See American Institute of  
 Architects
AIID. See American Institute of Interior  
 Designers
Alabama, 22, 25, 29f
AMA. See American Medical  
 Association
American Institute of Architects (AIA),  
 21
 as deregulation opponent in Georgia,  
 51–52
American Institute of Interior Designers  
 (AIID), creation of, 20, 21
American Medical Association (AMA),  
 11
 control of medical workers, 15, 16
 state associations within, 49–50
American Occupational Therapy  
 Association, 55
American Society of Interior Designers  
 (ASID), 21
 pursuit of licensure laws by, 6, 20,  
 21–22, 24n6, 51, 52
Antipoverty programs. See Poverty  
 reduction
Architects
 as licensed occupation, 51–52, 53,  
 63, 75
 overlapping tasks of, 20, 23, 47, 51,  
 52, 58
Arizona, 29f, 94n3
ASID. See American Society of Interior  
 Designers
Australia, occupational licensing in, 70
Austria, 2012 data on numbers of  
 licenses in, 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
Baltic states. See Estonia; Latvia;  
 Lithuania
Bonding, 23
 surety bonds in, 19–20, 24nn4–5
Branstad, Gov. Terry, vetoes of, 5
Breyer, Justice Stephen, on decision  
 making, 37
Brokers. See under Financial industry;  
 Mortgage industry
Bulgaria
 2012 data on numbers of licenses in,  
 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Businesses as enterprises, 12, 80
 decision making and certifi cates in,  
 72–73
Cadillac effect, quality and cost in, 5, 17
California, 29f, 40–41, 94n3
Canada, occupational licensing in, 29f, 70
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman),  
 16–17
Certifi cates, 75
 favored in reform legislation, 86–87,  
 94n4
 as government standard, 1, 61, 65,  
 71, 72
 intent of, as step toward licenses, 21,  
 62
 as less onerous regulation than  
 licenses, 3, 73, 80, 83, 88
 licenses vs., 55, 71, 91–93
 requirements for, 28f, 72
China, occupational licensing in, 72–75
 certifi cates in, 72–73, 77nn8–9
 legal hierarchy in, 74
 licensing in, 73–74, 75, 89–90
 MHRSS, 72, 74–75, 77nn11–12
 perspective of, 2, 6, 7
Kleiner 2015.indb   107 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
108   Kleiner
Cisco (fi rm), legal certifi cates issued  
 by, 74
Closed shop, 69, 91
Collective bargaining, NLRA and, 13
Colorado, 9, 94n3
 workforce licensed in, 29f, 57
Competition, 27, 62
 among occupations in same industry,  
 50–53
 restriction of, 10, 12, 20, 22
Construction occupations
 contractors, 39
 electricians, 3, 14, 70–71, 80
 engineers, 14, 20, 21, 23, 52, 63,  
 70–71, 75
 laborers, 47, 74
 plumbers, 3, 14
 welders, 74
  See also Architects; Interior designers
Consumer prices
 certifi ed vs. licensed services and, 55,  
 71, 90
 deregulation effect on, 6, 23, 68, 85
 licensing effect on, 7, 26, 35–38, 44,  
 45n4, 80
Consumers, 40, 81
 licensing costs to, 4, 5, 23, 25, 32, 44n1
 as politically unorganized, 4–5
 prevention of public harm to, 6, 12,  
 36, 58, 79, 90
Cost-benefi t analysis, 89
 government interventions and, 25,  
 26, 79
 policy reform and, 81–82, 83, 94n2
Council on Medical Education, AMA, 16
Craft occupations
 blacksmiths, 12
 body artists, 25
 bricklayers, 47
 carpenters, 47
 furniture makers, 12
 musical instrument makers, 63
 potters, 63
 stonemasons, 63
 upholsters, 1, 83
  See also Trade unions
Cyprus
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Czech Republic, 2012 data on numbers  
 of licenses in, 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
Day, Ryan, deregulation and, 51
Decision making, 37, 72–73
Denmark
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Dent, Frank, credentials of, 13
Dent v. West Virginia, 13, 26
Dentists
 contested tasks of, 58, 80
 as licensed occupation, 1, 2–3, 4, 14,  
 48, 91
 mobility of, 31, 33, 85
 prices and, 26, 31, 37–38, 55, 81
 service quality of, 26, 38–39, 41, 81
Deregulation, 18
 construction occupations and, 22, 52
 effect on employment, 68, 81, 82
 effect on quality, 6, 52, 59n1, 68
 reducing growth in occupational  
 licensing by, 5–6, 86–88
Disadvantaged populations, 3, 93
  See also Low-income populations
District of Columbia (DC)
 licensed occupations in, 22, 25
 nonlicensed occupations in, and parts  
 fraud, 40–41
Doctors. See Physicians
Dues collection by professional  
 associations, 14
Earnings, 20, 25, 57
 licensed vs. unlicensed occupations  
 and, 7n1, 30–31, 55
 restricted supply of practitioner and,  
 16, 57–58
Economic theory, monopolies in, 11,  
 36–37, 79, 83
Education, 39, 65
 credentials from, and training (see  
 under Licensing requirements,  
 specifi c education and testing)
Kleiner 2015.indb   108 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
Index   109
Education occupations, teachers, 2–3, 31, 
 39, 43–44, 63
  See also various instructors under  
 Sports occupations
Employers, 11–12, 62, 75
Employment, 47
 certifi cates and, decision making,  
 72–73
 effect of deregulation on, 6, 68, 82
 licensing effect on, 7, 25, 26, 31, 43,  
 80
 unions and, benefi ts, 11–12
Estonia
 2012 data on numbers of licenses in,  
 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
European Union (EU), occupational  
 licensing in, 2, 7, 61–68
 focus and requirements of, 62–63
 licensed individuals in each EU- 
 27 country, 65–67, 66t, 76nn2–4,  
 77nn5–6
 licensed professions in each EU-27  
 country, 63–65, 64t, 76n1
 perceived overregulation in, 67,  
 88–89
  See also specifi c countries, e.g.,  
 Poland
Eurostat, coding schemes of, 65, 76n3,  
 77n5
Expanding Opportunity in America  
 (Ryan), 85
Featherbedding, dental industry and, 91
Federal Trade Commission, North  
 Carolina State Board of Dental  
 Examiners v., 37–38
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 6
 overuse of licensed services found  
 by, 40–41, 43
Federation of State Medical Boards,  
 AMA and, 16
Financial industry
 accountants in, 72, 75, 77n8
 brokers in, 63–64
 credit card providers, 88
Finland, licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
Flexner Report (Flexner), AMA  
 sponsorship of, 15, 16, 17
Florida, 29f, 57, 94n3
France, licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
Fraud, 90
 service quality vs., 41, 93
Free to Choose (Friedman and  
 Friedman), 10–11, 23n1, 98
Friedman, Milton
 on cost of quality, 5, 16–17
 on political economy, 10–11, 23n1,  
 79, 98
Friedman, Rose, on political economy,  
 10–11, 23n1, 98
FTC. See Federal Trade Commission
Funeral occupations
 fl orists, 1
 funeral directors, 14
Georgia, 29f, 51–52, 94n3
Germany
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Government regulation, 1
 incentives for, 4–7
 as market intervention, 25–26
 monopolies and, 11, 36–37, 79,  
 82–83
 reciprocity of, 2–3, 32, 80, 82, 94n3
  See also U.S. law and legislation
Grandfather clauses, time of hire  
 important in, 30, 70
Greece
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Grievance procedures, as voice effect  
 benefi t, 11
Guilds, medieval times and, 4, 12, 22
Harris Poll Interactive, survey projects  
 of, 27–28, 28t
Hawaii, workforce licensed in, 29f, 57
Health care, 90, 91
 ancient Greece and, 10, 22
 insurance reimbursements for, 48, 54,  
 85–86
Kleiner 2015.indb   109 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
110   Kleiner
Health care, cont.
 medical services and prices in, 40, 81
 overlapping occupations within, and  
 task allocation, 47–50, 53–54, 56,  
 58
Health care occupations
 anesthesiology assistants, 5
 behavioral and medical counselors, 5,  
 74
 dietitians and nutritionists, 5, 74
 eye care, 41, 85
 nurses, 14, 31, 47–48, 63, 75
 occupational therapists (OTs), 47,  
 53–58, 85–86
 paramedics, 1, 11, 28
 pharmacists, 75
 physical therapists (PTs), 1, 23–24n3,  
 47, 53–58, 88
 podiatrists, 63
 respiratory therapists, 4
 surgeons, 10, 92–93
  See also Dentists; Physicians
Health care occupations, substitutes in
 dental hygienists, 17, 28, 35, 41, 55,  
 58, 80, 81, 91
 nurse practitioners, 17, 35, 47,  
 48–50, 55, 58, 80
 nurse’s aides, 3
 physician’s assistants, 47, 55
Hippocratic Oath, 10–11, 22
Hospitality occupations
 bartenders, 61
 tour guides, 1, 3, 6
 travel agents, 3, 63
Human resources occupations
 employment agents, 6, 73
 managers, 74
Idaho, licensing legislation vetoed in,  
 5, 25
Illinois, 4, 29f, 49
Income inequality, 37, 85
Indiana
 licensed workforce in, 29, 29f
 licensure legislation in, 5, 15, 25,  
 87–88
Industrial occupations
 boilermakers, 41
 scrap metal recyclers, 25
  See also Manufacturing sector
Industrial Revolution, effect on  
 enterprises and guilds, 12, 22–23
Information access, 27, 31, 33, 93
Innovation
 benefi ts from nonregulated services  
 as, 90–91
 licensing effects on, 7, 17, 38, 42, 80
Institute for Justice
 licensure law and, 3, 6, 86
 survey projects of, 27–28, 28t
Insurance industry
 health care reimbursements by, 48, 56
 monetizing risk through, 42, 44
 social insurance in, 36–38, 44
Interior designers
 licensing sought by, in all states, 2, 6,  
 9, 21, 23, 52–53
 nonlicensed, as certifi ed and  
 registered, 21–22, 50–51, 53, 83
 overlapping tasks of, 20, 23, 47, 51,  
 58, 59n1
International licensing, 34, 36
 issues in, and policy implications,  
 88–89
 perspectives on, 2, 5–6, 7 (see also  
 China, occupational licensing  
 in; European Union, occupational  
 licensing in; United Kingdom,  
 occupational licensing in)
International product markets, local vs.,  
 12
International Standard Classifi cation of  
 Occupations (ISCO), 66t, 77n5
Iowa
 licensing in, 28, 29, 29f
 licensure legislation vetoed in, 5, 25
Ireland, licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
ISCO. See International Standard  
 Classifi cation of Occupations
Italy
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Jacksonian populism, few state  
 regulations during, 13
Kleiner 2015.indb   110 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
Index   111
Job creation, licensing effect on, 80
Job openings, barriers to, 30, 34–35, 44
Job skills
 appropriate, 3, 4, 93
 manual or mechanical (see  
 Construction occupations)
Judicial and legal occupations
 attorneys, 1, 5, 6, 26, 31, 33–34, 37,  
 43, 63, 75
 court clerks, 6
 notaries, 6
Kansas, workforce licensed in, 29f, 57
Labor markets
 advantage of certifi cates in, 72–73
 improving, with policy reform, 6, 61,  
 79
 licensing as institution of, 2, 6–7, 9,  
 25, 44, 74, 88
 outcomes in, and effect of  
 occupational regulations, 54–55,  
 59n1
 standardized inputs to, with  
 technological advances, 40, 80
 supply in, 11, 30–31
Labor reform
 barriers to occupational access and,  
 84–85
 certifi cates favored in, 86–87, 94n4
 cost-benefi t analysis in, 81–82, 83,  
 94n2
 federal role in, 80, 83–86
 improving markets with, 6, 61, 79
 legal principles in, during  
 Progressive Era, 13–14
 potential for, 79–83
 state legislation for, 81–82, 86–87,  
 94n2, 94n4
Latvia
 2012 data on numbers of licenses in,  
 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
 upper and lower bound ISCO worker  
 codes for, 64t, 65, 77nn5–6
Lawyers. See under Judicial and legal  
 occupations, attorneys
Licensed occupations, battles among,  
 47–59
 construction personnel in, 47, 50–53,  
 58
 health care personnel in, 47–50,  
 53–58
Licenses, 3
 as government standards, 1, 69, 73
 growth of occupations that require,  
 1–2
 interaction of unions with jobs that  
 require, 9, 10–11, 23n1
 standard method for obtaining, 14–15
Licensing boards, 21, 88
 members serving on, and work  
 capture, 37–38
 state, and functions, 1, 4, 16, 17, 58,  
 70, 80, 87
Licensing requirements
 bonding, 20, 23
 professional investments, 33, 38, 89
 residency, 2–3, 74
 specifi c education and testing, 1, 2,  
 3, 7n1, 16, 28t, 32, 43, 63, 70,  
 73–74, 85, 89
Licensure laws, 6, 55, 70
 legal principles on, during  
 Progressive Era, 13–14
 opposition to, 3, 27, 51–52
 organizational lobbying for, 4–5,  
 14–15
 support of, 3–4, 51
Lithuania
 2012 data on numbers of licenses in,  
 64t, 65, 66t, 76n4
 licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
Local institutions, 12
 broader than federal, in their reach,  
 83, 85
 cost-benefi t analysis as policy reform  
 by, 81–82
 governmental licenses and, abroad,  
 71, 74
Loss aversion, consumer risk prevention  
 as, 36, 90
Louisiana, 29f, 59n1
 licensed occupations in, 1, 25, 40–41
Kleiner 2015.indb   111 11/23/2015   1:34:38 PM
112   Kleiner
Low-income populations
 barriers to, 3, 34, 43, 85
 licensed services affordability to, 4,  
 42, 43, 81
Lowery, Michael, deregulation and,  
 51–52
Malta, licensed individuals in, 66t, 67
Manufacturing sector, U.S. economy  
 and, 3, 12, 80
Massachusetts, 28, 29f
Medicare, 56, 57, 85–86
Mexico, occupational licensing in, 29f
MHRSS. See Ministry of Human  
 Resource and Social Security,  
 China
Michigan, 28, 29f
Microsoft (fi rm), legal certifi cates issued  
 by, 75
Migration
 international, and licensing, 34, 89
 interstate, and licensing, 31–32, 32f,  
 43–44
Ministry of Human Resource and Social  
 Security (MHRSS), China
 certifi cates issued by, 74, 77n11
 certifi cation data from, 72–73, 77n10
 certifi ed licenses and, 72, 75, 77n12
Minnesota, 1, 29f
 policy reform in, legislation, 81–82,  
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 and, 70, 72
PTs. See under Health care occupations,  
 physical therapists
Public harm as occupational  
 consequence, 3, 73
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